




GLOBAL RISK FORECAST 2025

Forging resilience
through expert intelligence



Foreword

The Crisis24 Intelligence Team serves our clients globally 24/7, 365 days a year. With a decades-long pedigree in the private security space, it has grown and evolved its capabilities in line with the exponential growth in international business and travel since the turn of the century. This has ensured that it is providing best-in-class analysis and actionable advice to enable clients to mitigate threats to their employees, their assets, and their business operations, wherever they may be.

Our regional experts are based around the world, providing breadth with true global monitoring and extensive, local familiarity. Our thematic experts provide additional depth to cover environmental, maritime, aviation, health, and cybersecurity threats. Our Intelligence team also provides the foundations for our operational teams while exploiting the “ground truth” from our extensive global footprint and deployed personnel to provide additional coverage with a high degree of granularity.

This Global Risk Forecast highlights the big picture developments that could impact clients’ businesses in the coming year. The standout threat that continues the theme of 2024 is the geostrategic impact of the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine. In 2025, it will become increasingly apparent that the Middle East and Ukraine are symptomatic of a new geopolitical fault line, with Russia, Iran, and their allies on the one side, the West and its allies on the other, with powerful actors such as India towing a neutral line. This new reality threatens to overthrow the global security architecture that has been in place since the end of the Cold War, while China, in particular, continues to drive a return to a more multipolar world, free of Western dominance, all in the context of a new – likely isolationist – Trump administration in the US.

The geostrategic changes will intersect with, and often amplify, local conflicts and divisions. They will also threaten normal business activity at street level in some areas in the medium term. Grassroots polarization among the population in several regions, including Africa and Asia, whether it manifests as adversarial demonstrations around the Israel-Palestinian dispute, or vocal frustration inciting socio-economic and ethnic friction, will be highly visible in 2025. Disruptions directly attributed to the ongoing conflicts, whether it be the interruptions to maritime supply chains or international air travel, will complicate the day-to-day running of many organizations. Indirect impacts, including state-sponsored cyberattacks or misinformation and disinformation campaigns, will sow doubt and uncertainty among those tasked with making forward-looking decisions and remain among the most potentially impactful risks of 2025.

Decisionmakers need well-informed, relevant, and confident assessments of the likely threat landscape wherever their organizations operate. This Global Risk Forecast will provide them – and readers in general – with a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the most pressing issues expected to shape the year ahead.



Mick Sharp
Senior Vice President, Operations & Intelligence
Crisis24

Executive Summary

Concurrent large-scale crises will affect business operations and the security environment in most regions in the coming year. Many countries will be watching out for the implications of president-elect Donald Trump's re-election to the White House. In the US, Trump's convincing victory will likely quell the possibility of unrest during the transition period, but frequent, and at times large, demonstrations are likely throughout the year. Opponents of the incoming administration view many of its policies as a significant threat, and protests are likely following major legislative measures or high-profile appointments.

Further south, organized crime will continue to present security challenges throughout Latin America. Factional infighting among drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico, the likely failure of negotiations between the government and major armed groups in Colombia, and the growing capabilities of criminal organizations in Brazil and the Caribbean will likely prompt a regional increase in violence.

The escalation in the Middle East since Oct. 7, 2023, now sees Israel fighting with Iranian proxies - and twice so far with Iran itself - around the region. Questions around how a new potentially hawkish Trump administration will impact the trajectory of the Israel-Iran tensions remain, though in the absence of any ceasefire in Gaza, the fighting will continue and could escalate further. While hostilities last, economic and political instability will continue to manifest as security and operational threats in the medium term.

In Europe, the regional impacts of the war in Ukraine continue, with Russia expected to continue destabilizing hybrid activity, including cyberattacks, psychological operations, and plausibly deniable sabotage to influence the information space and cow potential opponents. Such tactics will continue to target Western governmental, political, and civil society organizations, as well as private-sector organizations, causing physical, financial, and reputational damage. Moscow also intends to undermine confidence in democratic institutions and exploit existing societal divisions to destabilize and deter its critics. With Trump expected to have a more isolationist approach toward Ukraine, Kyiv's ability and willingness to continue the war could falter, leaving Russia with a Pyrrhic victory, with potentially severe consequences for NATO and transatlantic unity more generally.

Fragile civilian governments, ethnic extremism, and weak governance will all contribute to uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific region, while growing competition between the US and China will have knock-on political effects in Southeast Asia and beyond. Meanwhile, Afghanistan will remain a stronghold for Islamist terror groups, heightening the risk of attacks abroad. In Myanmar, ongoing conflict is expected to exacerbate militancy and organized crime in neighboring countries, while the Middle East conflict may encourage radicalization and violent extremism in some countries.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, persistent government instability and militant jihadism will continue to destabilize the Sahel region. Growing protest movements driven by Africa's young, digitally-connected population are expected to expand beyond Kenya and Nigeria, potentially spreading across other regions. Additionally, deteriorating political relations between Ethiopia and Somalia could create a security vacuum, which might be exploited by Al-Shabaab, further complicating efforts to stabilize the Horn of Africa.

At sea, the Al-Houthi threat will continue to disrupt maritime traffic in the Red Sea, having detrimental knock-on effects for global supply chains. A potential escalation between Israel and Iran could further impact supply chains, including crucial oil shipments via the Strait of Hormuz. Hostilities in the Middle East will continue to disrupt the aviation sector as airlines work to safely navigate conflict zones and manage disruptions arising from short-term escalations. These ongoing challenges will drive regulators and operators to adopt new safety protocols and operational strategies, which, in the longer term, could reshape the dynamics of the global air travel industry and have broader implications for its efficiency and resilience.

Ongoing conflicts will have repercussions that will persist even after hostilities cease. Related public health crises, including disease outbreaks, population displacement, healthcare disruptions, and psychological trauma will likely affect global health security in the longer term due to damaged healthcare infrastructure, the suspension of vaccination programs, and possible surges in infectious diseases in affected regions.

The current geopolitical instability will highlight the increasing necessity of assuring cybersecurity for critical infrastructure. New technologies around artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing both assist and bring new challenges to those charged with minimizing the threats from criminal or state-led cyberattacks.

Climate change means that the increased likelihood of disruption arising from extreme weather events worldwide is now the new normal. The scale, duration, and intensity of such events will threaten travel and business operations, necessitating greater concentration from business leaders on adapting facilities and processes to ensure operational continuity.

The coming year will be dominated by the impacts of high-profile geopolitical tensions. Routine security threats remain, which will likely often be exacerbated by grassroots political and economic polarization as well as operational disruption.

CONCURRENT
LARGE-SCALE CRISES
WILL AFFECT **BUSINESS**
OPERATIONS AND THE
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
IN MOST REGIONS IN
THE COMING YEAR.




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REGIONAL OUTLOOK

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA



Zanzibar, Tanzania

REGIONAL OUTLOOK

Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to face significant security and political challenges in multiple regions through 2025. The Sahel region continues to be plagued by government instability and militant jihadism, despite an ongoing shift in external security guarantors. New protest movements organized by Africa's young and digitally-connected population are likely to continue in Kenya and Nigeria and expand into other regions. Political relations between Ethiopia and Somalia are deteriorating, potentially opening a security vacuum for the Al-Shabaab militant group to exploit.

2025 EVENTS TO WATCH

New security guarantors in the Sahel are unlikely to prevent the spread of insecurity and jihadism in the region, increasing pressure on the local military regimes.

Protest movements may expand across the continent as Africa's digitally-connected youth share grievances and mobilization strategies.

Ethiopia's ongoing attempt to gain access to the sea is escalating tensions with Somalia and Egypt, which could impact security operations against the Al-Shabaab militant group.



External Security Pivot Likely to Increase Insecurity and Instability Across Sahel Region


Government instability and militant jihadism in the Sahel Region will almost certainly contribute to a worsening security situation in the coming year, despite the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (Alliance des Etats du Sahel, [AES]). The security pivot in the Sahel has led to an exodus of traditional external partners and the introduction of various private military companies (PMCs) to the region.

Following the recent withdrawal of Western assistance operations, countries such as Russia, Türkiye, and Hungary, among others, have begun filling the growing security void as an initial step in furthering their strategic geopolitical ambitions, even at the risk of short-term losses. Amid the backdrop of protracted insecurity in neighboring countries, such as Libya and Sudan, the security environment is unlikely to improve in the long term.

FORMATION OF REGIONAL ALLIANCE UNLIKELY TO ADDRESS INSTABILITY

Military intervention in Sahelian politics has become the norm rather than the exception. The fragile state of the Sahel is partially due to continuous and seemingly persistent cycles of military actions. At the same time, endemic governmental corruption continues to stall sociopolitical and economic development within the region. The AES, an integrated regional organization composed of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, was formed in late 2023 to consolidate mutual defense and economic cooperation. Their fragile governments will likely face mounting domestic pressure to improve their security situations, though the current transitional leaders are unlikely to have more success in this regard than their predecessors. Instead, the AES project will likely act under the guise of a security alliance to enable existing Sahelian juntas to remain in power indefinitely. Members will continue to suffer attacks by well-financed jihadist militant groups in the context of limited military resources, dependence on external security partners, and with a general atmosphere of political instability and ineffective governance.

With the possible withdrawal of the three nations from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2025, expanding operations by Russia's Africa Corps (formerly known as an arm of the Wagner PMC) will likely increasingly isolate the Sahel internationally. The Kremlin has extended security and trade partnerships with Sahel governments by strengthening their ability to fight militant jihadism. Russia's involvement with threatened nations in Africa appears to focus on supplanting Western influence; filling the growing security void in these countries is likely an initial step in furthering the Kremlin's more strategic geopolitical ambitions, including in Libya and Sudan. Cross-border militant movements and the proliferation of arms from protracted conflict zones are increasingly fueling broader militant operations, as illegal weapons transfers from Libya empower jihadist groups, such as Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, further complicating the security situation.



PMCs COULD ENCOURAGE MILITANCY

The shift towards non-traditional security and economic partners could increase militant activity-related insecurity across the Sahel and beyond. The possible arrival of Turkish-backed security contractors in Niger, dubbed the "Turkish Wagner," could provoke localized conflict. PMCs often aggravate local tensions with increasing military operations, while undermining local authorities. Such partnerships will likely strengthen militant jihadist affiliations by worsening Sahelian insecurity. As Al-Qaeda seeks to expand its regional influence, this could have long-term implications for ECOWAS. Coastal states in West Africa will likely experience a contagion effect as increased militant violence continues to escalate along the northern borders of Benin, Togo, and Ghana, with the primary drivers of terrorist insecurity being the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS).

Nevertheless, external mercenary organizations, and in particular their external state sponsors, will probably view any losses of military personnel or assets deployed in the region as largely acceptable in pursuit of their broader geopolitical goals. Related developments will produce new challenges, while providing lucrative opportunities as Sahelian governments grant mining and natural resource concessions in exchange for security support. On the one

hand, unless the new partnerships produce substantive security improvements, a greater Russian presence in the Sahel, for example, will serve to make Russian assets in the region more exposed to militant attacks. However, by solidifying its foothold in the region, Russia may also see increased revenue streams.

CONCLUSION

The Sahel suffers from insecurity and instability, as well as uncertainty around regime change. AES members have faced significant security challenges from various militant groups over the previous decade and five military takeovers since 2020. There remains widespread discontent within the ranks of their armed forces, as previous coups have cited an inability to remove militant threats among their top motivations. The shift from a multifaceted Western approach to a state use of foreign PMCs will disrupt longstanding security partnerships and potentially increase militant jihadism. This could contribute to further government instability and potential regime collapse. Without a robust standing AES counter-terrorism force, the Sahel will continue to provide attractive opportunities for exploitation by militant groups and will very likely see the introduction of further mercenary groups into the region.

Africa's Digitally-Connected Youths Likely to Continue Civil Unrest in 2025

Sub-Saharan Africa's very young and digitally-connected population will likely engage in further bouts of civil unrest in the coming year. As seen in 2024, an incident in one country can rapidly spawn similar movements abroad through social media. Online mobilization can quickly incentivize thousands to take to the streets, with the more structured or tenacious movements capable of forcing policy, government, or regime changes.

KENYA TO CONTINENT

The protests in Kenya became a continental focal point for 2024. President William Ruto's government attempted to pass a new finance bill to help remedy the country's crippling debt. It would have imposed new taxes on income, trade, foodstuffs, health, and housing, among other things, in a sharp turn toward austerity. Public opinion staunchly opposed the policies which would directly increase the cost of living. Nationwide protests erupted, peaking on June 25 when demonstrators stormed the parliament buildings. Ruto initially gave in to some demands, scrapping the bill and slightly reshuffling his cabinet to include some members of the opposition.

In the following months, protests in Kenya became the catalysts for similar movements abroad. In July, activists in neighboring Uganda used social media and other online assets to successfully mobilize nationwide protests denouncing corruption; at least 45 people were arrested in the resulting demonstrations. In August and September, Nigerians directly cited Kenya as an inspiration for protests opposing hunger, economic hardship, and government corruption, during which several people were killed. In September, Ghanaian social media users protested electoral fraud, leading to over 50 arrests. Protest organizers also found support in South Africa

KEY JUDGMENTS

- Protest movements may expand across the continent as Africa's digitally-connected youth share grievances and mobilization strategies.
- The generational gap between the young median age of sub-Saharan Africa's population and its aging political leadership is creating a growing disconnect, likely fueling rising public unrest.
- Economic hardship, militant instability, and political crises will likely prompt an increase in disruptive civil unrest that could threaten regional stability.

and Mozambique, achieving a notable social media presence albeit without generating actual unrest.

MOBILES TO MOVEMENTS

These events are significant due to the lack of domestic triggers; rather, this highlights a continent-wide latent risk for protest due to two separate factors. First, Sub-Saharan Africa has the youngest population in the world, with a median age of around 19.7 and over 400 million citizens aged between 18 and 35. Africa also has the oldest cohort of leaders, with the average age of heads of state being over 60. This places a younger population, or "Gen-Z," in a position where they cannot relate to their governments and places leaders where they cannot understand the aspirations of most of their citizens.

Second, African youths are also very much connected digitally. According to some estimates, as many as 74 percent of Africans access the internet through mobile



Africa has one of the world's youngest populations, which is highly connected through communications technology.

phones, likely due to the prohibitively high price of laptops. This has likely enabled movements to mobilize domestically through social media very rapidly and allowed for greater international publicity, with videos and hashtags crossing international, political, and linguistic borders. X (formerly Twitter) has proven especially popular, with several hashtags such as #RutoMustGo, #EndBadGovernance, #OccupyJulorbiHouse, and #RevolutionNow trending outside of their countries of origin.

DEMONSTRATIONS TO DISRUPTIONS


The scale of these protests, mobilizing tens of thousands of internet users, has the potential to disrupt travel, weaken the business climate, or even compromise government stability. While not the case in Kenya, youth-led movements over the years have played determinant roles in forcing political reforms in DRC, Burundi, Guinea, Nigeria, and Ghana, as well as government changes in Zambia and Senegal, and the coup in Burkina Faso. Calls for protests often include demands for the resignation of leaders.

CONCLUSION

Looking ahead to 2025, it is highly likely that episodes of unrest will increase. Notable focal points or triggers could be economic difficulties prompting austerity measures, instability created by rogue militant organizations, internal political crises within governing coalitions, and especially electoral periods. Moreover, there is a strong likelihood that earlier bouts of unrest could breed additional protest movements; countries that experienced episodes in 2024 could see new demonstrations in the coming months, with all the above-mentioned countries potentially experiencing further youth protests in the near future.

THE **YOUNG POPULATIONS** IN LEADING NATIONS ENJOY GREATER INTERNET CONNECTIVITY WHILE **WIDESPREAD ACCESS REMAINS LIMITED** IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

Sub-Saharan Africa's Age and Internet Access



Source: Crisis24, 2024 with data from CIA World Factbook, accessed in October 2024.

Ethiopia-Somalia Relations: Tensions Escalate as Mogadishu Partners With Egypt Against Addis Ababa's Somaliland Agreement

The relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia will likely deteriorate further in the coming year after the government in Mogadishu entered into a military alliance with Egypt. This partnership was formed to challenge Ethiopia's recent deal with the self-declared independent state of Somaliland and involves the deployment of up to 10,000 Egyptian troops to Somalia, along with significant military assistance. Addis Ababa views the growing Egyptian military presence in Somalia as a major national security threat, exacerbating the long-standing tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Nile River. Furthermore, the alliance also challenges Ethiopia's pursuit of sea access through its memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Somaliland in early January, a deal Somalia rejects as a violation of its sovereignty. This development will probably escalate regional tensions, disrupt peacekeeping efforts, and potentially create opportunities for extremist groups such as Al-Shabaab to exploit. The situation threatens to destabilize the already fragile Horn of Africa region, with far-reaching consequences for regional security and stability.

Egypt's military alliance with Somalia came at a time when the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) was preparing for its late 2024 hand-off to the African Union Support Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).



Somali flag on sleeve of military uniform

KEY JUDGMENTS

- Somalia's relationship with Ethiopia will deteriorate further as its military alliance with Egypt reignites longstanding tensions over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
- Ethiopia's attempts to gain access to the sea via a deal with the self-declared independent state of Somaliland are also escalating regional tensions.
- The breakdown in relations threatens to undermine joint efforts against the Al-Shabaab militant group, thereby threatening regional stability.

This new mission, which runs until December 2029, faces significant challenges, including financing and determining which countries will contribute troops. Somalia's preference for replacing Ethiopian forces with Egyptian troops in AUSSOM has heightened regional tensions, particularly given Cairo's potential involvement and its strained relations with Ethiopia. The situation is further complicated by Ethiopia's controversial deal with Somaliland for sea access, which Somalia strongly opposes. Somalia's Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre declared that Ethiopian troops will not be part of AUSSOM unless Ethiopia withdraws from the MOU. Ethiopia, in turn, has expressed concerns about the new AUSSOM mission, warning it could worsen regional tensions.

Ethiopia's pursuit of sea access and a military base on the Red Sea – possibly at Port Berbera or at Somaliland's planned port in the Lughaya region – continues to escalate tensions in the region despite various diplomatic

Diplomatic Tensions Between Somalia and Ethiopia Over the Somaliland MOU

- Port Berbera
- Lughaya
- Somaliland
- Countries Allied with Somalia
- Other Horn of Africa Nations



efforts to defuse the situation. Ethiopia has further complicated matters by upgrading its consular office in Somaliland to full embassy status, signaling a deepening of ties with the state. In an attempt to ease the growing conflict, Djibouti proposed a compromise, offering Ethiopia management of its Red Sea port of Tadjourah. However, this offer was reportedly rejected as Ethiopia remains focused on securing a naval base, a goal that Addis Ababa views as crucial to its strategic interests. Other diplomatic initiatives, including Turkish-led mediation attempts, have thus far proven unsuccessful. Moreover, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's pursuit of Red Sea access has also angered neighboring Eritrea, which vehemently rejected his claims of Ethiopia's rights to control the coastline. Eritrea's statement pointedly refused to engage in any discourse with Abiy on the matter, highlighting the deteriorating relations between the two nations. The recent tripartite agreement between Somalia, Eritrea, and Egypt has further strained relations, with Ethiopia perceiving this alliance as a threat to its national interests. These developments underscore the intractability of the dispute and highlight the potential for continued regional instability.

The breakdown in relations between Ethiopia and Somalia could severely hamper joint efforts to combat Al-Shabaab, creating security gaps that the militant group can exploit. As governments become distracted by diplomatic and potential military confrontations, resources and attention may be diverted from counter-terrorism efforts. This shift in focus could allow Al-Shabaab to regroup and strengthen its position. Moreover, if Ethiopian troops are forced to withdraw from Somalia due to the diplomatic rift, it could create a security vacuum in certain areas,

which Al-Shabaab could quickly move to fill, especially if the transition to Egyptian forces is not seamless.

The regional conflict could also exacerbate local grievances and instability, providing Al-Shabaab with new recruitment narratives and potentially increasing its support base among disaffected populations. The deteriorating relations may lead to a breakdown in intelligence sharing between Ethiopia and Somalia, which has been crucial in combating Al-Shabaab, significantly impairing efforts to prevent and respond to terrorist activities. Additionally, there's a risk that regional powers might indirectly support various factions within Somalia, inadvertently creating conditions that Al-Shabaab could exploit to expand its influence.

CONCLUSION

Escalating tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, exacerbated by Egypt's military alliance with Somalia and Ethiopia's controversial deal with Somaliland, have created a volatile situation in the Horn of Africa. The impending transition from ATMIS to AUSSOM adds another layer of complexity to an already fragile regional dynamic. Despite diplomatic efforts, including Djibouti's proposals and Türkiye's mediation attempts, the situation remains unresolved and potentially explosive. The breakdown in Ethiopian-Somalian relations threatens to undermine joint counter-terrorism efforts against Al-Shabaab, creating security gaps that the militant group could exploit. This deteriorating situation not only jeopardizes regional stability but also risks creating a power vacuum that extremist groups could fill.

ASIA-PACIFIC

REGIONAL OUTLOOK

The Asia-Pacific region will face various threats to stability over the coming year. Fragile civilian governments in South and Southeast Asia, as well as shifting domestic and external factors, will contribute to an unpredictable business environment. Religious and ethnic extremism will continue to evolve in response to security force activity, domestic politics, and global events. While the overall terrorist threat remains stable in most countries, an elevated possibility of attacks will remain, especially against Western and Chinese targets.

2025 EVENTS TO WATCH

Fragile civilian governments in Southeast Asia will face challenges from corruption, military influence, and the US-China rivalry.

Myanmar's unrest may fuel militancy and crime in neighboring countries.

Afghanistan and the conflict in the Middle East may heighten regional threat from terrorism and radicalization.



Hong Kong



Political Instability Heightening Operational Risks Across Parts of the Asia-Pacific

Deteriorating underlying issues across the Asia-Pacific, including fragile civilian governments, alternative political power sources, and foreign influence, may hinder revenue potential and traveler safety through 2025. Fragile governments could aggravate institutional corruption, coalition trends, and military interference. As Sino-US competition unfolds, external pressures on domestic policy outcomes, especially in Southeast Asia, will likely increase. Emerging alternative agents of political power, including military institutions and ethno-religious groups, may contribute to safety concerns and an unpredictable business environment.

FRAGILE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTS

States with higher levels of institutional corruption have weaker public trust due to doubts about the government's ability to use available resources transparently. Officials promoting business ventures based on personal incentives rather than developmental merits could discourage foreign capital by increasing operational costs and eroding confidence in the investment climate. This erosion of public trust can exacerbate civil unrest, risking traveler safety and disrupting business operations and supply chains. In 2025, continued unrest will therefore likely stem from challenges faced by fragile civilian institutions in addressing systematic corruption. Related disruptions will likely impact South Asian states like Bangladesh, which saw the removal of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's government on Aug. 5. Sri Lanka continues to face challenges in mitigating issues related to low and high levels of corruption that continue to foment unrest following the 2022 economic crisis.

KEY JUDGMENTS

- Institutional corruption, expanding military influence, and coalition politics will sustain fragile civilian governments in the face of public dissatisfaction, which may occasionally erupt into civil unrest.
- Intensifying US-China competition will continue to shape domestic politics and business operations across Southeast Asia.
- Alternative agents of political power will likely exploit social fault lines and anti-government sentiments, prompting outbreaks of disruptive protests and violence in some areas.

EMERGING COALITION TRENDS

The emergence of coalition governments in countries like India and Thailand, which require multiple party approvals, has led to unpredictable policy inconsistencies that can create operational uncertainties and potential business risks. Organizations must contend with diverse stakeholders, which could stagnate developmental processes because of domestic bureaucratic hurdles. Businesses attempting to comply with these systems could incur higher administrative fees, inadvertently raising operational costs.


India's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) now relies on its coalition with regional parties to drive its economic reform agenda following recent elections. Regional parties will likely demand special incentives for their states, particularly in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, home to two of the largest regional parties. This may lead to initiatives based on political incentives rather than developmental merits.

APAC: Corruption, Unrest, and Political Violence

-  Insurgency or terrorism
-  Political protests
-  Violent unrest

Very corrupt to clean (0-100)

-  Clean (scores over 60)
-  Some corruption
-  Widespread corruption
-  Very corrupt (scores below 25)
-  No data



Source: Esri, ICAD GIS

In Thailand, Paetongtarn Shinawatra was sworn in as prime minister in early September following her predecessor's dismissal over alleged ethical violations. Shinawatra faces the challenge of revitalizing a stagnant economy and maintaining a delicate coalition with pro-monarchy parties heavily influenced by the military establishment.

EXPANDING SHADOW OF MILITARY INSTITUTIONS

Increasing military influence over civilian governments in Indonesia, Pakistan, and Thailand may lead to additional risks for businesses and travelers due to potential instability from unpredictable governance. Under President Prabowo Subianto, Indonesia is witnessing a greater military and law enforcement presence in government, which could create increased repression of dissent under national security laws. Rising discontent over alleged military interference in Pakistan's Feb. 8 general elections has increased incidents of civil unrest. In Thailand, the continued prominence of military-linked parties in the ruling coalition will hinder efforts to reform *lèse-majesté* laws and threaten the stability of the Pheu Thai Party, which is battling an economic downturn and its polarized political legacy involving coups to oust two of its premiers.

GEOPOLITICAL PRESSURES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Regional competition will likely continue shaping geopolitical and strategic business decisions. Ongoing US sanctions and efforts to curb Chinese involvement in high-tech sectors, particularly in producing microchips, have created intensifying competition in Southeast Asia to maintain economic influence. After a period of domestic stagnation, Beijing will likely increase investments in Southeast Asia to reinforce its commitment as a primary economic hub while circumventing US sanctions. This has been effective in Malaysia and Indonesia, where growing solar power and infrastructure projects have led governments to adopt more pro-China business policies for economic gain. China has also implemented austerity measures in rare mineral extraction and battery production due to lower-than-expected growth, limiting foreign businesses' access to these critical sectors. This will likely drive foreign companies to continue derisking and decoupling from China to minimize exposure to potential US sanctions and compliance challenges amid the trade war. US industrial policies and protectionism could increase regional economic pressures further as Washington considers tariffs to address concerns over China's diversion of US sanctions. Due to ties with Chinese firms, tariffs on solar panel production are already in

place in Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam. The ongoing competition will likely drive further government incentives for businesses to decouple from China and move toward Southeast Asia.

The Philippines' increasingly direct response to Chinese vessels near its shoreline in the South China Sea (SCS) could signal a decoupling of Beijing-Manila ties. Chinese grey-zone activities disrupt commercial operations in these waterways. China's expanded naval presence in the Taiwan Strait, following the inauguration of President Lai Ching-te, has spurred increased naval activity from Australia, Japan, and the US. Effective escalation management will remain essential for mitigating economic uncertainty.

POLITICAL RISKS ARE LIKELY TO SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCE BUSINESS AND TRAVEL DECISIONS ACROSS THE REGION.

EMERGING AGENTS OF POWER

New or alternative agents of power will likely impact medium-term regional business continuity. In 2024, the influence of Malaysian and Thai monarchies on domestic and regional politics grew. In Malaysia, newly crowned Sultan Ibrahim Iskander has adopted a more politically engaged approach, including a visit to China to bolster bilateral ties and investment opportunities. The Thai monarchy's influence has increased with the stricter enforcement of lèse-majesté laws, which will likely slow the country's democratic transition, creating an increasingly ambivalent investment climate. Increasing opposition by Thai youth could potentially cause significant business disruptions or outbreaks of unrest that may affect the safety of foreign travelers.

Business operations in Myanmar will experience enduring operational insecurity due to the civil war between Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and military forces. Mounting territorial losses amid a plummeting economy have increased the military administration's dependence on neighbors, such as China, to broker ceasefires. The involvement of regional countries in controlling conflict-related instability, such as refugee influxes, recurrent land border closures, cross-border shelling, and business disruptions, will likely expand in 2025. Although the junta



The ascension of Thai Prime Minister Shinawatra emphasizes the unyielding influence of business elites, military, and monarchy in civilian governments, sustaining the risk of fresh pro-democracy protests.

will likely retain control of major cities like Yangon and Naypyidaw, resistance groups – which control over 60 percent of the territory – have increasingly established de-facto administrative control, including direct engagements with international actors, businesses, and countries. Worsening economic conditions from security concerns, utility shortages, currency devaluation, and manpower loss prompted by mandatory conscription will likely challenge effective governance.

As ethno-religious violence increases across the region, political agents will likely exploit social fault lines, especially in Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan. Ongoing protests in Pakistan's Balochistan region have disrupted China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) efforts, threatening prospective projects. Chinese nationals will likely remain at risk of attacks as civil unrest continues. Resource extraction projects will likely face abrupt closures as well as access and personnel safety issues in Papua New Guinea's East Sepik and Enga provinces amid ongoing ethnic violence.

Violence against religious minorities in Bangladesh, such as Hindus and Sufis, may intensify amid the possible rise of far-right Islamist parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami. Recurrent clashes and violent protests resulting in wide-ranging security concerns as well as infrastructure and service disruptions are likely throughout 2025.

CONCLUSION

The operational environment in several countries in South and Southeast Asia will remain unpredictable. Precarious political situations, an inability to counter institutional corruption, external pressures, and emerging influencers in various guises will all present security and operational challenges in the coming year.

Emerging Militancy Trends Present Fresh Challenges for Counter-Terror Operations

SOUTH ASIA UNDER PRESSURE FROM MILITANCY

South Asia is a global hotspot for terrorism, with Pakistan leading the region in terror casualties. The country has struggled to fight Islamist and separatist outfits effectively amid prolonged economic crises and political unrest. Further expansion and strengthening of Baloch separatist groups like the Baloch Liberation Army, which have conducted several high-profile attacks including regular targeting of Chinese nationals linked to resource extraction projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) initiative, is likely. Mass casualty attacks involving Chinese nationals may prompt the unprecedented involvement of China in directly guarding Chinese entities with private security groups and assisting Pakistan's counter-terror operations.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban has used a combination of violent crackdowns, financial interdiction by controlling informal financial markets, and rehabilitation efforts to reduce domestic attacks. While the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K) faces the most repressive measures by the ideologically opposed Taliban, it has the highest growth potential due to various factors. It could exploit the marginalization of certain groups like Tajiks and Salafi Muslims, extreme poverty worsened by significant foreign aid cuts, and cite curtailment of women's rights under the Taliban's strict interpretation of Islamic laws. The burgeoning youth population amid the repatriation of at least 1 million Afghans from Iran and Pakistan could also present an opportunity.

Although the Taliban has banned Afghans and the use of Afghan soil to plot or conduct attacks on foreign nations, such actions continue. Long-time Taliban ally Al-Qaeda has been encouraging supporters to use its new safe houses and facilities in Afghanistan for mobilization against "Western" and "Zionist" forces. The IS-K claimed responsibility for a March 2024 attack in Moscow, Russia, while increasing its propaganda efforts in South Asia. Online radicalization has been linked to several terror cells in southern India, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka, with

KEY JUDGMENTS

- Afghanistan will remain a haven for Islamist terror groups, escalating the risk of attacks on foreign soil.
- Ongoing clashes in Myanmar are likely to prompt resurgent militancy and heightened organized criminal activity in bordering countries.
- Conflict in the Middle East threatens fresh waves of radicalization that will lead to increased counter-terror measures.

an emerging trend of transnational collusion between such groups. The Afghan Taliban has also failed to negotiate any meaningful ceasefire between the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Pakistani government and has been unable to reduce the TTP's significant footprint within Afghanistan. In the medium term, the failure of economic growth plans may instigate the Taliban to provide havens for ideologically aligned transnational terror groups as a financial tool and project itself to be spearheading a renewed war against alleged anti-Islamic forces to quell any public dissatisfaction.

MYANMAR INSTABILITY DRIVES TERROR THREAT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The rise in organized crime amid domestic conflict in Myanmar is another driver of terror risk in Asia. As counter-drug trafficking efforts by the previous democratically elected government have been largely abandoned, Myanmar overtook Afghanistan as the largest opium poppy cultivator in 2023. The lucrative drug trade has funded and sustained the domestic conflict – 90 percent of the trade is concentrated in northern Shan State, which is a stronghold for several ethnic armed

organizations. Gambling and cybercrime syndicates run by Chinese triads have proliferated under the junta's rule. Although ethnic militias have cracked down on the compounds in northern Shan State in the past year, the criminal syndicates have shifted their operations to other regions like Kayah State, where they benefit from protection from local militias and the junta. Attacks by anti-junta forces on Chinese projects, officials, and nationals remain possible.

The UN estimates at least 117,000 Myanmar nationals have fled to neighboring countries since 2021, with the largest outflow to Bangladesh and northeast India. Over 900,000 Rohingya refugees already live in Bangladesh's Cox's Bazar, where authorities claim at least 11 armed groups are active and engage in illegal drug and human trafficking, extortion, and deadly gang violence. Recruitment by insurgent groups such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) is also reported. Refugee arrivals are additionally heightening ethnic tensions in India's Manipur State over allegations by Meitei groups that Kukis, who share ethnic ties with the Chin people of Myanmar, are facilitating illegal immigration. Even after the Indian government scrapped a free movement regime with Myanmar in February 2024, concerns persist over cooperation between militant outfits sustaining a long-standing Kuki separatist insurgency. Indian authorities warned in September that at least 900 Kuki militants have trained in drone and projectile launches as well as jungle warfare by Myanmar groups. In late October, fatal clashes occurred between Manipur's Meitei-linked separatist groups and Myanmar-based Kuki outfits. Any fresh waves of insurgent violence will likely prompt trade, movement, and security curbs in border areas that can hamper regional connectivity efforts like the Kaladan transport project and the India-Myanmar-Thailand highway.

EXTERNAL AND DOMESTIC FACTORS MOTIVATE LOCAL EXTREMISTS


Islamist terrorism remains a potent threat in Southeast Asia despite a so far overall muted response by known terror outfits to the Israel-Hamas conflict. In Indonesia, prominent terror groups Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) have been focusing on reorganization amid crippling arrests and funding constraints. However, decentralized cells of the disbanded JAD continue to perpetrate attacks, including plotting to target police facilities to disrupt the 2024 presidential elections. JI also announced its decision to disband June 30, sparking new concerns. JI-run schools, which have been key grounds for recruitment and indoctrination, may eventually operate legally. The group will also likely intensify ongoing efforts to infiltrate institutions like political parties, security forces, state-owned enterprises, and civil services to mainstream its ideology. This relates to a trend of increased tolerance towards extremist political stances in Malaysia and Indonesia. Endorsements of pro-Palestine sentiments without condemning Hamas' extremist ideology in both nations could heighten the risk of self-radicalization, contributing to a growing trend of lone-wolf and family group attacks. The alliance between the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) and the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), which have openly promoted the Islamization of Malaysia, may also lead to increasingly divisive rhetoric, straining relations between the country's majority Muslim population and others.

Meanwhile, case studies in the Philippines and Thailand demonstrate the limitations of peace processes. The first parliamentary elections of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) may be postponed to 2026 following a legal decision to separate Sulu from the

OVER 900,000 ROHINGYA REFUGEES LIVE IN COX'S BAZAR, WHERE AUTHORITIES CLAIM AT LEAST 11 ARMED GROUPS ENGAGE IN ILLEGAL DRUG AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING, EXTORTION, AND DEADLY GANG VIOLENCE.



Imphal, Manipur, India



region. Any delay in completing the political transition process set out by the 2014 pact between the Filipino government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front could trigger escalations by extremist factions and other Islamist elements such as Abu Sayyaf and Maute Group. Similarly, sporadic terror attacks with limited civilian casualties continue in Thailand's Deep South amid inconsistent progress in peace talks with Islamist separatist groups in Mindanao. Militants conducted arson attacks in over 40 locations across the four southern provinces during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan in 2024, with no imminent end to additional small-scale attacks that will continue to stall normalization of the security situation. The enduring social and economic backwardness of affected regions, prevalent distrust of security forces amid allegations of abuses, and the extant influence of violent indoctrination will continue to foster insecurity.

Security forces across Asia are therefore likely to focus on safeguarding foreign entities linked to major infrastructure projects, as well as detecting and preventing radicalization

and illegal cross-border movements of funds, arms, narcotics, and people. Related measures such as surveillance laws and the expansion of military and police powers are likely to face opposition on the grounds of potential misuse against dissidents, minority groups, and political opponents, sustaining challenges for counter-terror efforts through 2025.

CONCLUSION

Terrorism and insurgency are the chief threats faced by multiple South and Southeast Asian nations. Religious and ethnic extremism is constantly evolving in reaction to security responses, domestic politics, and global events. In 2025, further changes that demand responsive actions by counter-terror agencies are likely. While the overall terror threat level remains moderate-to-high in most countries, an elevated risk of attacks remains especially likely against Western and Chinese nationals.

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA



Edfu, Egypt

REGIONAL OUTLOOK

The Middle East has rarely experienced such a tumultuous period as it has since the Hamas attack against Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. Beyond tensions between Iran and Israel, Tel Aviv is fighting Tehran's proxies in Gaza, the West Bank, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen; the collapse of the Syrian government was an unintended consequence of Oct. 7. Donald Trump's electoral victory has raised questions about whether the new US administration will follow a more hawkish policy toward Iran. Political, security, and economic instability will continue to affect the region, as long as the conflict in Gaza persists.

2025 EVENTS TO WATCH

An uptick in Iran-Israel tensions will almost certainly degrade stability in the MENA region.

The so-called Iran-aligned "Axis of Resistance" is not likely to cease attacks against Israel unless there is a ceasefire in Gaza.

Any expansion of the conflict will aggravate travel and aviation disruptions, causing further economic slowdown in MENA, likely prompting further political and social uncertainty.



Iran-Israel Tensions to Reshape the Middle East's Geopolitical Landscape


Hamas' Oct. 7 attack drew a swift reaction from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and also signaled Iran and its regional proxies to begin attacking Israel with drones and missiles. However, few observers anticipated Tehran's direct attacks on Israel on Apr. 13 and Oct. 1, 2024. The barrage of drones and missiles from Iran sought to deter Israel from attacking Iranian allies and interests across the Middle East. Israel, however, did not back down; instead, it expanded its attacks. Tel Aviv's Oct. 26 retaliatory airstrikes on Iran demonstrated a level of sophistication and superiority that likely gave Tehran pause before launching a counterattack.

Israel has significantly degraded Hamas' and Lebanese Hizballah's (LH) capabilities, eliminating Hamas' entire command and control structure. The targeting of LH degraded their abilities to project force in support of Bashar al-Assad's government in Syria as opposition forces launched a surprise blitzkrieg campaign that contributed to his downfall on Dec. 8. The IDF is still battling Hamas remnants in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF's efforts to locate and combat Hamas militants has yet to achieve some of the Israeli government's war aims, such as freeing the over 100 hostages still held in Gaza. The perpetual battle against Hamas demonstrates that it will make every effort to reconstitute itself unless the Israeli government implements a viable political strategy enabling Palestinians to rebuild following the destruction from the ongoing conflict.

The re-election of Donald Trump in the US has introduced further uncertainty over whether his administration will pursue a more hawkish approach to Iran. During Trump's first term, the US withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive

Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, and imposed severe economic sanctions on Tehran. Trump ordered the drone strike that killed Quds Force commander Major Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad in 2020 – it is no surprise, therefore, that Tehran attempted cyberattacks against the Trump presidential campaign and also allegedly plotted to assassinate him. Trump's foreign policy and his rhetoric on the campaign trail in 2024 suggest that he is not interested in foreign wars, nor is it likely that he will initiate a war with Iran. However, his administration will almost certainly expand economic sanctions and likely give Tel Aviv more leeway in potentially striking Iran's nuclear facilities. Nevertheless, it is uncertain whether any new approach will encourage Tehran and its proxies to cease their attacks against Israel and US-led coalition bases in Iraq and Syria. What appears almost certain to reduce tensions, however, would be a ceasefire in Gaza; the big question is whether the new administration in Washington can achieve that.

DONALD TRUMP'S FOREIGN POLICY PLAN AND RHETORIC ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL IN 2024 SUGGEST THAT HE IS NOT INTERESTED IN FOREIGN WARS.



While Iran and its proxies have threatened to strike the Gulf countries' energy infrastructure if Israel targets Tehran's oilfields, it is unlikely that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) would launch direct attacks against those Gulf nations that maintain close relations with the US. The two Gulf countries that remain somewhat neutral are Qatar and Oman; however, Doha and Muscat have not only retained friendly relations with Iran but have also long been serving as mediators among the warring parties in the region.

IRAN-ISRAEL: ARCHENEMIES ATTEMPTING TO RESHAPE THE REGION

Tehran and Tel Aviv have been archenemies since Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution. Israel asserts that Iran poses an existential threat and that it will do everything it can to stop it from obtaining nuclear weapons. In return, the Iranian government believes that the US and Israel are working towards regime change in Iran. The fear, mistrust, and bellicose rhetoric and actions have prompted both countries to engage in a series of escalatory activities against each other. Over the years, Iran has invested heavily in what it calls its "Ring of Fire" strategy. This

multi-pronged strategy aims to encircle Israel through its proxies and create strategic depth. Soleimani was the architect of this concept; he helped create the LH, as well as Shi'a militia groups in Syria and Iraq. He also expanded Iran's ties with the AL-Houthis in Yemen, and increased Iran's military and financial assistance to Palestinian militant groups.

It is likely no coincidence that a day after Hamas' Oct. 7 attack, LH began launching projectiles into northern Israel. Similarly, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq started launching attacks against US-led coalition bases in Iraq and Syria on Oct. 17, and the Yemen-based AL-Houthis began attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea on Oct. 19. LH and the AL-Houthis have stated that they will stop their attacks only when there is a ceasefire in Gaza. Despite the US and UK regularly targeting AL-Houthi radar systems and drone/missile storage sites, the group has yet to yield. While the conflict in Gaza continues, it is almost certain that the AL-Houthis will continue launching their attacks against ships in the Red Sea.

Israel, unlike Iran, has few allies in the Middle East. Still, what Tel Aviv lacks in allies it makes up for in military



Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Washington DC, July 24, 2024

superiority. Tel Aviv's martial dominance, combined with its intelligence reach, has historically forestalled its enemies from invading or launching massive air campaigns against it. Hamas' Oct. 7 attack was therefore significant as it destroyed what Iran's Minister of Strategic Affairs Javad Zarif dubbed Israel's "myth of invincibility." Israel has since done everything it can to restore deterrence and cause significant damage to its enemies to ensure they think twice before attacking directly. The Israeli government's deterrence strategy, known as the Samson Option, materialized following the country's establishment in 1948 and involves massive retaliation – including using nuclear weapons as a last resort – in the event that the country is invaded or suffers major destruction. Israel's current campaign in the region aims to weaken Iran and decimate LH and Hamas to render them militarily ineffective for years to come.

THE OCTOPUS DOCTRINE AND THREATS OF REGIME CHANGE IN IRAN

The Netanyahu government appears jubilant over Trump's re-election, which the Israeli prime minister has called "history's greatest comeback." During his first term, Trump not only ditched the Iran nuclear deal but also moved the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. He also applied the "maximum pressure policy" to Iran to curtail Tehran's largest source of funding – its oil exports. While the policy failed to change Iran's regional and nuclear policies,

sanctions reduced Iran's oil exports by 95 percent from 2.5 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2018 to only 70,000 bpd in 2020, curtailing the country's oil revenues by some USD 50 billion. In the wake of the 2024 US election, Trump has appointed Brian Hook, the man who was responsible for enforcing economic sanctions against Iran, to lead the transition at the Department of State.

Another key figure who will almost certainly play a crucial role in the administration vis-à-vis Iran is Trump's son-in-law Jared Kushner. Kushner has advocated for a more aggressive approach, and, with LH's missile arsenal mostly destroyed, has also expressed his belief that Israel now has an opportunity to dismantle the Iranian regime once and for all.

Similarly, in a direct address to the Iranian people on Sept. 30, Netanyahu stated that Iran would be "liberated sooner than people think," betraying his support for regime change in Tehran. Netanyahu is not the only Israeli politician pushing for such regime change. In a recent press interview, former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett opined that an opportune time had come to target Iran's nuclear program and the regime itself. Bennett is credited with implementing the so-called Octopus Doctrine in 2022, under which Israel "no longer plays with the tentacles" (i.e. Iran's proxies), but instead "goes for the head." Bennett asserts that the doctrine has diminished Iran's ability to defend itself by severely weakening LH and Hamas.

Nevertheless, whether Netanyahu finds a better ally in Trump than he did in President Biden remains to be seen. While Trump has a history of being more hawkish toward Iran, it is still unclear whether the US government would support an Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities.

IRAN'S OPTIONS IN THE EVENT OF ESCALATION

The Iranian government's primary objective is survival, shaping both its domestic and foreign policy agendas toward the longevity of the current regime. Should the US and Israel launch strikes aimed at regime change, Tehran will take multiple steps to exponentially increase the economic and political costs to its adversaries. Tehran can significantly increase material and military support to its proxies in the region, further complicating the six-front fight in which Israel is currently engaged in Gaza and the West Bank, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. The Al-Houthis and Iraqi militias' missile attacks have not only caused casualties in Israel but have also disrupted commercial and air operations within the country. Such attacks could increase.

Iran could also launch more robust missile attacks through LH in Lebanon. While LH's arsenal has been degraded, the group is still capable of lethal attacks on Israel. Iran could also encourage militants in the West

Bank to launch suicide attacks within Israel. Violence in the West Bank, particularly by Israeli settlers against Palestinians, is already an issue and Tehran could exploit existing tensions to exacerbate current security concerns.

In addition, Iran has increased cyber operations against Israeli corporations since Hamas' Oct. 7 attack. Microsoft, in its Digital Defense Report in October, noted: "Following the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war, Iran surged its cyber, influence, and cyber-enabled influence operations against Israel." Iran's influence operations across social media platforms aim to cause social and political instability in its adversary's home territories. Iran's cyber operators have also been behind the activation of false rocket sirens in Jerusalem, Eilat, and other cities. In the event of escalation, it is almost certain that Iran will also launch cyberattacks against Israel's perceived Gulf allies, including the UAE, Bahrain, and even Saudi Arabia. These are countries whose critical infrastructures, including oil refineries, Tehran has targeted previously.

The IRGC will also likely increase its assassination attempts. In October, Israel's internal security services, the Shin Bet, arrested seven Jerusalem residents alleging that they had been recruited by Iran to assassinate Israeli officials and conduct attacks. The Shin Bet has asserted that potential Iranian targets could include scientists, mayors, senior members of the security establishment,



Airstrike destruction in Beirut, Lebanon

and other prominent Israeli officials. In November, Israeli authorities increased security for Brigadier General Yotam Sigler, commander of the Nevatim Airbase in southern Israel, after an Iranian plot to assassinate him. On Nov. 8, the US Department of Justice charged an Iranian national who was allegedly involved in assassination plots against several Iran-designated targets, including Donald Trump.

THE OUTLOOK FOR THE REGION

The road to security, political stability, and economic vitality goes through the Gaza strip. A ceasefire in Gaza will not address all the political ills and economic woes that are engulfing the region, but it would be a viable start. The Al-Houthis insist that they will cease their military campaign against Israel once its military campaign in Gaza ends. Still, Israel is unlikely to withdraw from Gaza, particularly now that it feels it has the upper hand. The IDF operation in Lebanon will not likely expand now that there is a ceasefire in place, though it remains to be seen if the two sides will continue to honor the terms of the agreement.

Jordan, where most people are of Palestinian descent, is deeply concerned about the spillover effects of the conflict in Gaza. Demonstrations against Israel continue to occur on the streets of Amman. Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan feels emboldened. The Jordanian government worries that the conflict in Gaza will encourage Islamist factions with ideological ties to Iran to exploit the situation and launch attacks to destabilize the kingdom. The Islamic Action Front – the Muslim Brotherhood’s political party in Jordan – hailed two Jordanians who crossed into Israeli territory in October and wounded two soldiers, calling the assailants’ actions “heroic.” The potential linkage between Iran-aligned Shi’a militias and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has caused deep concerns within the royal family.

The conflict in Gaza has also severely impacted Jordan’s tourism industry upon which a significant section of the economy relies. The conflict has also brought about an economic crisis in Egypt as a result of a decline in tourism and a drop in revenue from the Suez Canal due to the Al-Houthi attacks against commercial vessels in the Red Sea. The Egyptian economy is also facing inflation, growing public debt exceeding 90 percent of its GDP, and devaluation of its currency against the US dollar. As the conflict continues, investment in the region,

particularly in Egypt and Jordan, could fall significantly, causing further economic decline in these countries. Economic hardship will almost certainly translate into political instability in the region.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have also faced attacks from Iran and its proxies in recent years. In the event of escalation, the latter have threatened to attack them due to their friendly relations with the US and Israel. However, it is unlikely that Tehran would launch kinetic military attacks against GCC nations because it does not want to antagonize them, particularly as it faces economic isolation. However, Iranian proxies would probably conduct attacks mainly from Iraq and Yemen. Saudi Arabia and Iran have reached a détente. In the absence of a security treaty with the US, Riyadh will not engage in any actions that Iran might perceive as belligerent.

CONCLUSION

The traditional concept of deterrence appears to have eroded since the Hamas militant attack on Oct. 7, 2023. The potent mix of national pride and a desire for retribution has created an exceptionally dangerous environment ripe for escalation. While Israel enjoys technological and military superiority and will continue to achieve tactical and operational successes on the battlefield, as manifested by the decimation of LH’s and Hamas’ command and control, Iran and its proxies seek to deny it strategic success by blocking Tel Aviv’s efforts to reshape the region in its own image. Historically, violence in the region has only begotten more violence and created friction points for future conflicts. While a ceasefire agreement in Gaza may dial down tensions in the short-to-medium term, ultimately it is Tel Aviv and Tehran and the contours of their rivalry that will dictate the future trajectory of the region in terms of security and commercial opportunities.



The conflict in Gaza has impacted Jordan's economically important tourism industry.

EUROPE AND RUSSIA



Moscow, Russia

REGIONAL OUTLOOK

Russia is likely to continue destabilizing hybrid operations in Western Europe to influence the information space and deter potential adversaries. Such activity will likely target governmental, political, and civil society organizations, as well as private-sector companies, causing physical, financial, and reputational damage. With Donald Trump expected to have a more isolationist approach toward Ukraine, Kyiv's ability and willingness to prosecute the war could falter, leaving Russia with a Pyrrhic victory, but with potentially severe consequences for NATO and transatlantic unity more generally.

2025 EVENTS TO WATCH

Russian information campaigns will increase around key elections, especially in Western Europe and Moscow's sphere of influence.

Unrest will rise around major dates, including Victory Day (May 8-9) and the anniversary of the Ukraine invasion (Feb. 22).

Aerial attacks in Russia and Ukraine will likely intensify before the US presidential inauguration (Jan. 20).



Offensive Hybrid Activity by Russia Set to Intensify Across Europe

Russia will almost certainly continue the hybrid warfare tactics it currently employs to further its interests around the world, potentially expanding them through 2025. Moscow has a well-established program that combines cyberattacks, psychological operations, and physical sabotage to influence outcomes and manipulate narratives globally, as well as to maintain an ever-present shadow threat over any real or perceived adversaries.

Moscow's various intelligence agencies and proxies may target Western governmental, political, and civil society organizations, as well as businesses and non-profits. Targeted organizations may experience direct and indirect effects from Russia-sponsored cyberattacks, social media-based psychological warfare campaigns, and low-level sabotage-for-hire operations. Impacts can include physical damage to property and infrastructure, lost revenues, and significant reputational harm. Electoral institutions and influential individuals are also not immune; Moscow will almost certainly continue to promote its political allies and apologists, while undermining its critics, in elections across Europe through 2025. While Russia is certainly far from the only state actor engaging in such activities, it does have one of the world's most developed and pervasive programs.

Russia has a decades-long history of employing robust, varied, and often highly sophisticated tradecraft techniques to further its strategic objectives of countering perceived threats from NATO and bolstering its overall geopolitical influence. Against the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and NATO's overt support for Kyiv, Moscow favors hybrid warfare as a cost-effective tool to maintain plausible deniability and expand its operational outreach without provoking a broader international military escalation.

KEY JUDGMENTS

- Russia will almost certainly continue hybrid warfare in Western Europe, including cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and sabotage attacks, and could expand them in 2025.
- Moscow, either directly or through the use of proxies, could target Western governmental, political, and civil society organizations, as well as private-sector businesses and non-profit-making organizations.
- Moscow will almost certainly continue to promote its political allies and apologists, while undermining its critics, in elections across Europe through 2025.

Russia's approach integrates cyber tactics with kinetic operations by employing electronic warfare and intelligence capabilities to disrupt critical infrastructure and manipulate public perception. International businesses in the energy, finance, and healthcare sectors targeted by Russia have incurred significant revenue losses, with operational disruptions leading to expensive downtime and exposing sensitive information. Russia's behavior will likely grow increasingly provocative through the course of the year, as Moscow's previous challenges to Western security have failed to draw a response in kind from targeted nations.

Moscow will continue to use these techniques in support of its strategic objective. Russia will likely employ its doctrine of Information Confrontation, which includes two critical components: using technology to manipulate information and conducting psychological operations (PSYOP) to alter

narratives and influence the actions of perceived adversaries. Moscow's centralization of institutional mechanisms and processes as well as effective integration of state and non-state entities has enhanced its technical sophistication.

PSYOP: SOWING DISCORD

Moscow's PSYOP efforts can be particularly effective and difficult to counter. Russia has orchestrated disinformation campaigns using several launch vehicles aimed at eroding public confidence in governments and creating new or exploiting existing societal divisions. Russian government-funded websites and anonymous pro-Moscow sites distribute disinformation and propaganda for foreign consumption.

Social media, however, provides fertile ground for elevating the impact of disinformation while concealing the perpetrator's identity. In some cases, an operative need only plant a seed in the form of a well-designed and positioned post before social media algorithms and user engagement amplify the effect by quickly spreading it to large audiences. Russian-backed "trolls" and "bots" will be continually employed in 2025 to create and accelerate content that might exacerbate social tensions or polarize communities. Moscow will continue to back radical protest groups, including nationalist and ultranationalist movements, and attempt to exacerbate existing divisive issues such as rival pro-Palestinian and pro-Israel protests.

Moreover, legacy media organizations can become unwitting accomplices to the spread of disinformation through human error and the desire to prioritize fast, impactful reporting. This is particularly problematic as traditional news sites can give these false reports the illusion of stronger credibility.

CYBER: AN EVOLVING THREAT

Additionally, Russian threat actors have carried out cyberattacks targeting Ukraine, the EU, and NATO countries and their allies. They have targeted critical infrastructure – particularly the energy sector – and government communications such as satellite systems. Attacks also target financial institutions, telecommunications and IT companies, and defense contractors in rival countries. The EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) reports that the number of Russian-origin attacks against European infrastructure doubled from the fourth quarter of 2023 to the first quarter of 2024. However, assistance from Western governments and cybersecurity companies largely thwarted these efforts.

In 2025, Russian cyber operations will continue to evolve in terms of targets and tactics, driven by geopolitical shifts


and technological advancements. Attacks on critical infrastructure, including power, transportation, and energy sectors, will almost certainly continue, especially targeting Ukraine and NATO allies. Additionally, AI-powered bots will spread disinformation more efficiently. Moscow will explicitly target elections across Europe in 2025 with information operations. Important elections will be held throughout the year, including in Albania, Germany, Kosovo, Norway, and Poland; Russia is highly likely to launch disinformation campaigns, back anti-EU candidates, or otherwise seek to undermine electoral legitimacy.

RUSSIA HAS A LONG HISTORY OF USING ADVANCED TRADecraft TO COUNTER NATO THREATS AND ENHANCE ITS GEOPOLITICAL INFLUENCE.

SABOTAGE: MAINTAINING PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY

Outside the digital space, Russian actors will likely continue attacks on physical targets across Europe through 2025. European authorities have accused Moscow of involvement in a sharply increasing and wide range of physical acts of sabotage aimed at disrupting key infrastructure and military-industrial output. Political leaders, law enforcement agencies, and intelligence officials have accused Russia of orchestrating attacks in several countries, including the UK, Poland, and Germany, with a variety of targets in different types of locations.

In the UK, at least five individuals planned a series of arson attacks against businesses linked to Ukraine, successfully targeting at least one company in Leyton in March 2024. In the same month, a fire at a factory belonging to Diehl Metall, a manufacturer of missiles used in Ukraine, released a toxic cloud in Berlin. Further arson attacks with possible links to Russia have been reported in the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, including attempts to place incendiary devices near gas pipelines and onboard aircraft. Rather than be deterred by Western warnings, Russian operatives, emboldened by previous actions, will likely pivot toward more aggressive tactics in the year ahead.



Federal Security Service (FSB) headquarters in Moscow, Russia

The killing of a Russian military defector in Spain and an alleged assassination plot targeting the CEO of German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall are a radical departure from the pattern of operations aimed at static targets. Although the plot was foiled by US and German security services, the death of an EU citizen would represent a significant escalation of Russian operations within the EU. A successful assassination could increase reticence to assist Ukraine in the EU private sector while also stoking widespread anxiety about Russian-backed security threats. Similar assassination attempts remain likely in 2025.

Adopting a “gig economy” model was a key development in Russian sabotage operations in 2024. Most individuals arrested for sabotage incidents were EU residents or from countries outside Europe rather than Russian intelligence professionals. Some were alleged to have been recruited from the criminal underworld, such as the members of the group arrested in Poland. Others appear to have been lured from outside the EU, as in the case of a Colombian man contracted by Russian agents to fly to Prague and set fire to several buses.

This approach possesses several advantages for Russia: by subcontracting attacks, Russia can minimize the risk of arrest for its intelligence operatives, who are particularly difficult to replace during the ongoing war in Ukraine. Additionally, operating through non-Russian individuals improves Moscow’s plausible deniability, allowing it to use sabotage to sow uncertainty among the local population in the form of security concerns while concealing clear evidence of culpability. Furthermore, by subcontracting sabotage operations, Russia can effectively reduce the monetary cost of carrying out attacks, incentivizing further attacks.

Western intelligence agencies will probably maintain their practice of selectively declassifying and releasing evidence of Russian involvement in hostile clandestine

activities as part of their more comprehensive countermeasures. However, governments must exercise great caution as such releases can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they can provide a strong disincentive, but on the other hand, they can also give Moscow insight into how it can devise more effective ways of covering its tracks.

While robust digital and physical security measures will continue to be the main bulwark against the threats of cyber and kinetic attacks, proactive measures to thwart PSYOP activities remain much more limited. Although employee education, rigorous fact-checking, and reputation monitoring programs, as well as appropriate regulations and legislation are certainly helpful, such solutions often require significant time before they begin having the desired impact. Meanwhile, countering disinformation and other propaganda campaigns – regardless of the source – will continue to be mostly reactive, with targeted organizations primarily performing damage control rather than damage prevention.

CONCLUSION

As Russia’s geopolitical ambitions advance, its use of influence operations will almost certainly intensify. The growing integration of state and non-state actors in cyber operations will accelerate, eventually providing Moscow with greater operational flexibility and leading to more sophisticated targeted activities against international businesses perceived as adversarial or supportive of Western interests. The Russian intelligence apparatus will probably seek to expand its use of gig-economy-style recruiting for physical sabotage operations in the EU through 2025. As the war in Ukraine drags on, breaking down the EU’s collective ability to support Kyiv remains a crucial priority for Moscow.

Russia-Ukraine Conflict Facing a Turning Point in 2025

The Russia-Ukraine conflict will enter an intense and potentially terminal phase in 2025. Through mid-to-late 2024, the conflict escalated precipitously. Intensive aerial activity, further internationalization of the conflict, and increased pressure from Kyiv’s Western partners through early to mid-2025 will likely drive the warring parties toward substantive negotiations by the latter part of the year. Western military aid to Ukraine has long been intermittent. However, sustained aid will be essential for Ukraine to maintain an effective defense through the first half of the year, enabling the country to pursue a more favorable negotiated settlement.

KEY JUDGMENTS

- The deployment of North Korean troops will lead to a further internationalization of the conflict, which Pyongyang will use to justify expanded participation.
- Ukraine’s evolving strikes into Russia and a spike in Western aid in early 2025 will ultimately do little to turn the tide of the conflict.
- Looming US-driven peace talks threaten to undermine the foundations of European security by reneging on NATO’s commitments to Ukraine.

THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE CONFLICT

The deployment of North Korean troops in an active combat role in Russia’s Kursk Oblast will likely accelerate the internationalization of the conflict. Since the start of the war, Western nations have been indirectly involved through sanctions, military aid, and political support. Additionally, a small number of Western military advisors are likely present in Ukraine to oversee weapons shipments and train Kyiv’s forces in their use. However, the deployment of Pyongyang’s troops in late 2024 is a watershed moment, marking the start of a new, potentially critical, phase of the conflict. Pyongyang’s involvement will likely draw a firm response from its main adversaries, South Korea and the US. Seoul will likely increase military aid to Ukraine and deploy military advisers and observers to monitor North Korean troop activity. US military aid to Ukraine will surge in the early part of 2025 as the outgoing Biden administration seeks to shore up Kyiv’s defenses before late January.

Pyongyang will use South Korea’s likely actions to justify further military support to Russia, including additional troop deployments. Greater numbers of North Korean troops will allow Russia to avoid the political uncertainty and risks posed by ordering a general mobilization to support military operations in Ukraine. Additionally, China’s close alliance with North Korea will shield Pyongyang from the harshest Western reprisals for its involvement in the conflict. China will remain ostensibly neutral, but its close relationship with Russia and growing trade disputes with the West will combine to further facilitate Moscow’s war with Ukraine.

Ukrainian Attacks on Russian Energy Infrastructure

- Potential Targets
- Previous Strikes
- Ukrainian Territory
- Ukrainian Territory Occupied by Russia
- Russian Territory within Drone Striking Range
- Russian Territory



As Ukrainian ground forces continue to cede territory, long-range strikes targeting Russian infrastructure will persist and potentially worsen in 2025 as Kyiv attempts to pressure Moscow away from the frontline.

WESTERN SUPPORT TO UKRAINE

The re-election of Donald Trump as US president will be a destabilizing factor through early 2025 as the conflict continues to escalate. Western support will spike ahead of Trump's inauguration; however, it is unlikely to come to a sudden halt from Jan. 20. While Trump and his senior administrators are vocal about ceasing open-ended military aid to Ukraine, they will seek to enter negotiations with Moscow from a position of strength. The US will likely use the threat of vast military assistance to Kyiv to extract some concessions from Moscow.

Nonetheless, the apparent US desire to withdraw from European security affairs will likely play into Russia's hands, undermining NATO's promises to Kyiv and threatening the foundations of European security. Moscow will likely concede some of its maximalist positions, including political control over Ukraine's future. Trump will likely be willing to offer US recognition of at least some of Russia's annexed territories, including Crimea and the Donbas. There are few good outcomes for Ukraine, and Kyiv will receive scarce domestic support for either an expanded general mobilization or ceding territory to Russia.

NEGOTIATING PEACE IN AN EVOLVING CONFLICT

While Russia and Ukraine will seek to enter negotiations from a position of strength, peace talks likely to begin in the latter half of 2025 will see Moscow bargaining with the upper hand. Moscow will intensify efforts to eject the remaining Ukrainian forces from the Kursk Oblast in early 2025 and secure all but the largest remaining Ukrainian-held cities in the Donetsk Region by mid-year. Slovyansk and Kramatorsk will remain beyond Russia's reach. However, Moscow's forces will be within striking distance of the two population centers. Russia will not hesitate to use the threat of offensives on these cities as negotiating levers.

Without sustained Western assistance, Ukraine will struggle to halt Russia's advances, but will continue to prove resilient in defense and inventive with limited offensive capabilities and resources. Kyiv's deep strikes into western Russia will intensify through early 2025 and continue throughout the negotiation process – which could continue into the following year. However, Ukraine will increasingly seek to diversify its targets away from purely hydrocarbon facilities as this aerial campaign alone, while

notable, has had limited impact on Russian oil revenues, which increased through 2024. Facing possible strikes on other industrial facilities and strategic military assets, a halt to Ukrainian aerial attacks will be an intense motivator for Moscow in any negotiations.

CONCLUSION

Russia's continued intensification of ground combat, willing internationalization of the conflict, and escalating hybrid warfare against NATO members will further Moscow's strategic goals: countering perceived threats from NATO, bolstering its geopolitical position, weakening Western support to Kyiv, and the eventual military capitulation of Ukraine. Kyiv will be subject to domestic and international criticism due to the perception that Ukraine is apparently willing to make territorial concessions and could not obtain the necessary foreign support to maintain the defense of the country. Regardless of the details of any peace settlement, the current government in Kyiv would be unlikely to survive politically.

THE APPARENT
**US DESIRE TO WITHDRAW
 FROM EUROPEAN
 SECURITY AFFAIRS**
 WILL LIKELY PLAY INTO
 RUSSIA'S HANDS,
 UNDERMINING NATO'S
 PROMISES TO KYIV AND
**THREATENING THE
 FOUNDATIONS OF
 EUROPEAN SECURITY.**



Pokrovsk, Donetsk Region, Ukraine

AMERICAS

REGIONAL OUTLOOK

In 2025, organized crime will remain a major challenge in Latin America, with rising homicides in Mexico driven by infighting between drug-trafficking factions. In Colombia, peace talks will stall as criminal groups resist disarmament. Brazil and Haiti will also see escalating crime, hindered by weak international intervention. In the US, the transition to a new administration is expected to be smooth, though demonstrations relating to immigration policies and conflicts in the Middle East are likely to persist.

2025 EVENTS TO WATCH

Organized crime will drive increased violence, with DTO conflicts in Mexico, stalled peace talks in Colombia, and heightened criminal activity in Brazil and the Caribbean.

The new US administration is expected to transition relatively smoothly, with protests likely to persist over immigration and conflicts in the Middle East; the new government's foreign policy priorities will likely be Europe, the Middle East, and China.



Washington, DC

Organized Crime to Pose Major Threat in Latin America

Organized crime will continue to pose major challenges throughout Latin America in 2025, with infighting between rival factions of drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) fueling an increase in homicides in Mexico. In Colombia, negotiations between the government and the major armed groups are likely to reach an impasse in 2025, with criminals seeing little incentive to lay down arms. In Brazil, criminal organizations in the north of the country will likely expand their power, entering into alliances with the major gangs headquartered further south. Increased crime will also pose a major threat in the Caribbean, especially in Haiti, where significant funding and personnel issues will hinder international efforts to curb the power of gangs.

KEY JUDGMENTS

- Organized crime will pose a major security challenge throughout Latin America in 2025, with fighting between rival DTO factions fueling an increase in violence in Mexico.
- In Colombia, peace talks are unlikely to be successful in persuading major armed groups to renounce violence.
- Criminology will represent an increasing security threat in Brazil and the Caribbean, especially Haiti, where limited resources will restrict the potential for international actors to restore stability.



INFIGHTING WITHIN MEXICAN DTOs TO EXACERBATE VIOLENCE

Further fracturing of major Mexican DTOs into minor factions is likely in 2025, leading to an increase in violence. Such factionalization is particularly likely within the Sinaloa Cartel (Cártel de Sinaloa [CDS]), which dominates much of the Pacific coast and has long acted more as a federation of traffickers than a unitary organization with a single chain of command. Increased fighting between rival factions of the CDS is particularly likely given the 2024 arrest of Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada, who led the “Mayos” – the largest CDS faction. Following his arrest in the US, Zambada claimed that he was kidnapped by Joaquín Guzmán López, a significant leader of the “Chapitos” faction of the CDS, and forcibly brought to the US so that he could be arrested by US federal agents.

Shortly after the arrest, a significant increase in homicides, roadblocks, and hijackings was seen in Sinaloa state, where both the Mayos and the Chapitos operate; the violence has significantly affected Culiacán, the state capital. In 2025, infighting could also spread to other areas where the CDS has significant operations, such as Baja California, Baja California Sur, Chiapas, Chihuahua, Durango, Nayarit, and Sonora states.

Additionally, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación [CJNG]), the main rival of CDS, has reportedly become involved in some of the fighting between CDS factions, supporting the Chapitos in an apparent attempt to capitalize on violence that affects its main competitors. Throughout 2025, CJNG will likely attempt to prolong the conflict within the CDS, using the fighting to strengthen its position and expand its territory. The CJNG’s area of operations currently stretches along an east-west axis from the Pacific states of Jalisco and Colima across the central states of Guanajuato and San Luis Potosí to the Gulf Coast states of Veracruz and Tabasco. By moving north into CDS territory, the group could expand its power along a north-south axis on the Gulf Coast while maintaining its hold in other areas.

“TOTAL PEACE” REMAINS UNLIKELY IN COLOMBIA

In Colombia, it is unlikely that President Gustavo Petro will be able to fulfill his promise of establishing “total peace” with the country’s varied armed groups in 2025. Although the different armed groups in Colombia almost all style themselves as revolutionary movements, their primary focus has long shifted to cocaine production, illegal gold mining, and human trafficking, lucrative markets that their leaders are loath to abandon.

Negotiations with Colombia’s largest armed group, the Gaitanista Army of Colombia (Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia, [EGC]), are likely to remain at a standstill throughout 2025; though the group claims to be interested in peace, it has taken very few steps toward meaningful talks with the state, instead focusing on increasing coca cultivation and expanding throughout northern Colombia.

Negotiations with the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional [ELN]) are also not likely to make much headway, as the group has solidified its hold over many rural areas on both sides of the border with Venezuela and is likely to seek to profit from increased migration from the neighboring country. Not only will the ELN deepen its involvement in human trafficking across the border, but it will also likely seek to recruit new members among Venezuelan migrants with few legal means of supporting themselves.

Similarly, the various dissident factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia [FARC]) that are active in southern Colombia, including Segunda Marquetalia, Estado Mayor Central, and Comandos de la Frontera, will likely remain active and deeply involved in coca cultivation in their territories. They may also seek to build deeper ties to the powerful organized crime groups operating in neighboring Ecuador.



Vidigal favela, Rio De Janeiro, Brazil

ORGANIZED CRIME PRESENTS ONGOING THREAT IN BRAZIL

High levels of insecurity will likely persist in several parts of Brazil in 2025. States in the north and northeast serve as key trafficking routes to transport cocaine from Andean countries to Brazil's northeastern ports for transatlantic trafficking. The fragmented nature of DTOs in the northeast will also further contribute to violence there, especially in Bahia state, where around 20 criminal groups will likely continue to fight over territorial control. Local criminal groups will likely also continue to form alliances with larger rival DTOs from southeastern states, especially the Red Command (Comando Vermelho [CV]) and First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando Capital [PCC]), to obtain additional resources to fight in the region. For instance, Bonde do Maluco, one of Bahia's most violent DTOs and CV rivals, has worked in alliance with the PCC from São Paulo state and the Terceiro Comando Puro from Rio de Janeiro state to fight the CV. The presence of a variety of smaller criminal groups willing to form alliances with larger southeastern DTOs in the northeast is likely to increase territorial disputes in multiple areas, including in and around port cities such as Salvador.

A lack of coordination among state authorities and an increasingly militarized approach to security make major security improvements in Brazil unlikely in 2025. Governors are primarily responsible for public security; however, their ability to contain the expansion of DTOs' interstate and international links is limited. Under growing public and political pressure to implement a coordinated security response to organized crime, the federal government has announced the National Program to Combat Criminal Organizations, which aims to increase funding and coordination for law enforcement. However, the program will not be fully implemented until 2026, and actions in 2025 will likely focus only on key hotspots in Bahia and Rio de Janeiro states, obtaining minimal results.

In cities such as Salvador and Rio de Janeiro, where DTOs are known to engage in violent territorial disputes frequently, security operations are likely to result in civilian casualties in urban DTO-dominated areas, likely fueling further accusations of police brutality. In São Paulo, where the PCC operates, levels of violence are likely to remain below the national average as the group lacks major local competitors and continues to focus on the international drug trade. The PCC will also likely stay involved in a range of criminal economies, including real estate and virtual fraud in São Paulo and other states.

INTERNATIONAL TROOPS IN HAITI TO FACE MAJOR CHALLENGES

Security improvements will likely be very limited in Haiti in 2025 despite the ongoing UN-backed Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission. The mission will likely continue to face uncertainty and issues with limited resources and troops, and heavily armed gangs will almost certainly remain a major threat to organizations in the country, probably maintaining significant territorial control in Port-au-Prince and other areas. Throughout 2025, the sustained commitment of Kenya to continue leading the mission and the US willingness to supply funds and equipment will be key factors for the mission's success.

The trend of Haitian gangs shifting their focus from Port-au-Prince to rural areas will likely continue throughout 2025. A significant increase in violence has already been seen in the Artibonite department, located north of Port-au-Prince, with gangs such as Gran Grif being one of the leading groups responsible for attacks in the region in 2024. The Haitian National Police (PNH) is severely underfunded and understaffed, and it is unlikely to reach the capacity required to secure rural areas of the country in 2025. The MSS mission is also far from reaching its intended deployment of at least 2,500 troops from multiple countries. Most MSS efforts will likely prioritize security around critical infrastructure, such as Port-au-Prince's Toussaint Louverture Airport (PAP), to achieve greater political stability and pave the way to elections; deployments to rural areas will therefore likely remain limited. Overall, while the mission may lead to some improvements in the capital in 2025, limited security capabilities in rural Haiti will likely allow gangs to continue expanding their reach into new areas.

DRUG TRAFFICKING AN INCREASING CONCERN IN CARIBBEAN

Caribbean states other than Haiti could see an intensification in criminal activity, both in terms of international drug trafficking and local gangs. The Caribbean has grown in importance in recent months as a trafficking route for South American cocaine; some of this is bound for the US, often via the Dominican Republic. However, the burgeoning cocaine trade in Europe has made the Caribbean territories particularly valuable for trafficking. Not only are many Caribbean locations conveniently located between South American producers and European markets, but the UK, France, and the Netherlands each have multiple overseas territories in the region; once drugs are shipped into these territories, they are much more easily trafficked onward to Europe, evading external customs. With cocaine prices in Europe rising due to escalating demand, competition over these trafficking routes may spark increased violence.

THE BURGEONING COCAINE TRADE IN EUROPE HAS MADE THE CARIBBEAN TERRITORIES PARTICULARLY VALUABLE FOR TRAFFICKING.

Heightened localized criminal activity will also likely persist over the coming year. In 2024, a significant increase in violent crime, including shootings and robberies, occurred throughout much of the English-speaking Caribbean, including Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Trinidad and Tobago. Barring an improvement in underlying economic challenges or significant police efforts, this activity will likely continue, creating safety and operational concerns for organizations operating in the area.

CONCLUSION

Organized crime will continue to pose a major risk throughout Latin America in 2025, with criminal groups seeking to expand their power over territory and black markets. Even where criminal groups are likely to be hobbled by infighting, such as in Mexico, feuding between criminal factions will fuel rising homicide rates, and rival criminal groups will attempt to exploit the situation and increase their own operations. In Colombia, major criminal organizations have little incentive to lay down their arms and cease their operations, making it unlikely that the government will be able to achieve any result that even approaches "total peace." Furthermore, the ability of criminal groups to reach temporary alliances of convenience will be evident not only in Mexico but also in Brazil, where northern trafficking groups are already working alongside gangs based further in the south. Governments will struggle to confront these illegal groups, especially in Haiti, where an international effort to fight gangs will face significant headwinds.

Unrest Likely in US Throughout First Year of Trump Administration

Donald Trump's decisive victory over Vice President Kamala Harris, along with the strong performance of Republican candidates in the House of Representatives and the Senate, significantly reduced the incidence of demonstrations immediately after the election. However, the Trump administration will likely face frequent protests throughout 2025, with Trump's detractors increasingly taking to the streets in opposition to his policies.

KEY JUDGMENTS

- The initial transition to a new administration is unlikely to face significant challenges or unrest.
- Demonstrations around immigration and the conflict in the Middle East are probable.
- The new government will likely prioritize Europe, the Middle East, and China, while also increasing pressure on some countries in the Americas as part of its foreign policy priorities.

DOMESTIC POLICIES EXPECTED TO PROMPT CIVIL OPPOSITION

Moves by Trump and the Republican Party to restrict immigration and deport undocumented immigrants will likely be a focal point of early protests against the incoming administration. Trump and Republican leadership have vowed to make the controversial issue a priority, stating they will act immediately and take multiple measures to secure the country's borders and remove all undocumented immigrants. In fact, the president-elect has said he will declare a national emergency and will try to use the military to assist with deportations.

These actions will likely prompt demonstrations in Washington, DC, and other major cities throughout the country, as well as in towns with high numbers of undocumented immigrants and locations of immigration detention centers. Additionally, business and transport disruptions are likely in border areas as security is ramped up, and in towns where mass arrests may occur.

Other issues, such as access to abortion and LGBTQ rights, could also spark unrest. However, certain divisions



Donald Trump campaigning in Maryland

within the Republican Party on these topics are likely to prevent any major legislation at the national level. In contrast, state-level policies on the matter are more likely to provoke protest.

FOREIGN POLICY LIKELY TO BE CONTROVERSIAL

The new administration is also likely to face reinvigorated protests related to the conflict in the Middle East. The Trump administration will continue to support Israel, likely with fewer reservations than the Biden government regarding humanitarian issues. Additionally, high-ranking officials in the incoming government have signaled their opposition to a two-state solution to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and appear overall supportive of Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

Although demonstrations against US policy toward the Middle East subsided during the second half of 2024, the Trump administration's positions are likely to reinvigorate the pro-Palestinian protest movement, which will likely stage even larger and more disruptive demonstrations throughout the country. Such protests will likely cause business and transportation disruptions in major cities, as well as directly target some companies, such as those in the defense industry. Activists may also seek to draw on the experience of a recent strike by port workers, which briefly caused significant supply chain disruptions in the US; should protesters attempt to force the closure of ports by blocking access roads, disruptions to supply chains could recur.


In the second Trump term, foreign policy will likely focus on conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as relations with China. The administration will also aim to strengthen relations with Mexico and Central American countries to address immigration by slowing down incoming migrants and returning those deported from the US to their home countries. Additionally, at least in 2025, it is expected that pressure on the governments of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela will increase, as indicated by the nomination of Marco Rubio in the State Department and the appointment of Michael Waltz as National Security Advisor.

CONCLUSION

Trump's return to the presidency will likely have certain differences from his first term, but strong opposition from different sectors of society is expected to be constant as it was during his first four years in office. The strength of his victory and the initial response from most members and supporters of the Democratic Party will likely reduce tensions during the first weeks of the administration. But this time, Trump's increased control over the Republican Party and his choosing of more trusted allies for his cabinet and key positions in the White House will likely lead to more decisive action on his policy priorities, leading to inevitable clashes with opposition groups.



US-Mexico border



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ENVIRONMENT

More Extreme Climate Is Now the Norm, Requiring Adaption

Climate change is exacerbating the scale, duration, and intensity of extreme weather events worldwide and will continue to do so throughout 2025 and beyond. While there have been varying degrees of success in terms of commitments to reduce harmful emissions and technological improvements to mitigate climate change's impacts, the effects of a more extreme climate will continue to encroach on travel and business operations. Therefore, alongside these mitigation measures, there will be an increasing requirement to adapt to this new normal.

KEY JUDGMENTS

- Higher temperatures and other forms of extreme weather have become the new normal due to climate change.
- The impact of more extreme weather is being felt in many areas and businesses, and society as a whole will be forced to adapt.
- Adaptations need to be based on and guided by the best available science and make use of all available tools, from technological advancements to traditional local knowledge.

EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON EXTREME WEATHER AND ASSOCIATED IMPACTS

Ever-increasing scientific evidence proves a link between climate change and an upward trend in extreme weather events. Increased emissions have reportedly caused global temperatures to rise at alarming rates. 2023 was the warmest year ever recorded; towards the end of 2024, there were indications that it could be even hotter. Warmer temperatures also increase evaporation, allowing clouds to hold more moisture, resulting in heavier rainfall and an increased risk of flooding. Consequently, record-breaking flood events have become more prevalent. Longer heat-waves also exacerbate droughts, and warmer and drier weather provides conditions conducive to increased wildfire activity. While not believed to affect the number of tropical storm systems, climate change has been linked to an increase in the intensity of storms, both in wind speed and rainfall amounts.

The impacts of this increasing trend in extreme weather events have spread far beyond climate variation and the natural environment to many aspects of our day-to-day lives.

Infrastructure in many parts of the world is already under strain due to population growth, rural-urban migration, high levels of poverty, and the demand for more roads and vehicles. Climate change will exacerbate these strains; severe weather will cause short-term travel and business disruptions and long-term issues like subsidence. In many cases, infrastructure will be insufficient to meet the contemporary challenges. Less-developed communities will likely be the worst affected by these impacts due to fewer available resources and response capabilities.

Climate change is also exacerbating food and water security challenges. Agricultural yields are declining in many regions due to higher temperatures, droughts, and changes in rainfall distribution. Overall, food production is lagging behind an ever-increasing global population.

The effects of climate change represent a significant global health threat. Health will be directly impacted by extreme weather through heatstroke during high temperatures, death or injury during flooding, and indirectly through increased disease transmission, poor air quality, and malnutrition. Post traumatic stress and other mental health issues will also be a concern in areas impacted by extreme weather.



CHANGES TO THE CLIMATE SYSTEM

-  Changes in the hydrological cycle
-  Warmer land and air
-  Warming oceans
-  Melting ice
-  Rising sea levels
-  Ocean acidification
-  Global greening
-  More extreme weather
-  Change in ocean currents

Source: UK Met Office <https://www.metoffice.gov.uk/weather/climate-change/effects-of-climate-change>

IMPACT

-  Risk to water supplies
-  Conflict and climate migrants
-  Localized flooding
-  Flooding of coastal regions
-  Damage to marine ecosystems
-  Fisheries failing
-  Loss of biodiversity
-  Change in seasonality
-  Habitable region of pests expands
-  Forest mortality and increased risk of fires
-  Damage to infrastructure
-  Food insecurity
-  Heat stress

ADAPTING TO THE NEW NORMAL


While it will be necessary to continue to mitigate climate change's ongoing effects, individuals and organizations will also need to adapt if they are to minimize their social, physical, and financial impacts in the future. Social and economic systems will need to adjust to actual and expected climate change stimuli and their effects, including moderating their practices, policies, processes, and structures to limit potential damage and maximize benefit from any related opportunities. Due to the far-reaching impacts of climate change, each stakeholder, from individuals to governments and multinational corporations, will need to assess how best they can make the necessary changes and commit to these as part of a wider strategy, likely led at a national and international level.

Adaptation methods will take many forms, from technological advancements to traditional practices. Commercial enterprises and individuals can make use of improved information and a wide variety of available measures to ensure contingency plans, policies, and practices are commensurate with the changing climate, and safeguard assets, personnel, and reputations. AI and satellites will aid weather forecasting and improve early warning systems, but more traditional principles, such as building homes on stilts or replanting mangroves, can also be effective. Agricultural adaptations will include planting drought- or flood-resistant crops and improved irrigation techniques. Methods can also vary from hard measures, such as building improved flood defenses, to soft measures, such as appropriate hazard insurance and better urban planning.

Reported Natural Disasters Globally by Type, 1970 to 2024

The annual reported number of natural disasters, categorized by type in any given year, as of mid-2024. Note that this largely reflects increases in data reporting and should not be used to assess the total number of events.

- Drought
- Flood
- Earthquake
- Extreme weather
- Extreme temperature
- Volcanic activity
- Wildfire
- Glacial lake outburst
- Dry mass movement
- Wet mass movement



Source: Our World in Data <https://ourworldindata.org/natural-disasters>


Although in many cases there will be an associated cost with adopting some of these adaptive measures, this will often be outweighed by long-term financial savings. Modifying existing infrastructure and ensuring new buildings are able to cope with an increasingly extreme climate can reduce large damage costs from future weather events, as well as potentially save lives. The cost of smaller changes, such as using energy-efficient air conditioners and/or solar films on windows, will likely be outweighed by improved efficiency among staff. Taking time to ensure measures such as contingency plans and insurance policies are appropriate for the more extreme

climate will also have huge benefits down the line. Adaptive measures are not just necessary to reduce some of the impacts of climate change, but also to harness some of the opportunities changing weather patterns can provide. Initial costs of transitioning to green energy sources continue to fall (solar panel costs reduced by 30 percent in 2023) and once installed often provide cheaper and more efficient power; increased use of renewable energy sources not only mitigates against increasing emissions, but in some cases allows us to harness the increasing amount of sun and wind we are experiencing.

EVER-INCREASING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE PROVES A LINK BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE AND AN UPWARD TREND IN EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS.



Severe thunderstorm shelf clouds, Bulgaria



Blocking windows before a storm

CONCLUSION

Evolving to meet the challenges of this new normal will be daunting for many. Nevertheless, high temperatures, record rainfall, and extreme weather events are now common and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future. Extreme weather will impact many areas – including health, agriculture, transport, and supply chains – and travelers and businesses will routinely need to prepare and be alert for possible disruptive effects through 2025 and beyond. Governments, commercial enterprises, and all other stakeholders need to continue to adapt to ensure infrastructure, preparedness plans, and new technologies are sufficient to cope with these extremes. Efforts taken to adapt now will be rewarded by reducing the impacts of a more extreme climate going forward.

MARITIME

Maritime Disruptions off Arabian Peninsula to Persist in Medium Term

The Al-Houthi threat will continue to cause significant disruption in and around the Red Sea in the coming year. Al-Houthi attacks have compelled shipping companies to reroute around Africa, increasing costs and presenting other supply chain challenges. This will remain unchanged into 2025 and could persist regardless of any ceasefire in Gaza. Any prolonged confrontation between Israel and Iran would severely disrupt global energy markets by damaging infrastructure and restricting access through the Strait of Hormuz.

RED SEA AND GULF OF ADEN

Since November 2023, when the Yemen-based Al-Houthis announced that all Israel-linked shipping would be valid targets while Israeli operations in Gaza continued, over 100 vessels have been hit by uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), uncrewed surface vessels (USVs), or missiles, with two having been sunk. Al-Houthi strikes could continue in the Red Sea even if a ceasefire is reached as the group attempts to retain its popularity with its domestic and regional bases.

Several major shipping companies have halted operations in the Red Sea and opted for alternative routes around Africa. By August, traffic through the Suez Canal had fallen from around 2,000 transits per month before November 2023 to around 800. On average, shipments from Southeast Asia to the US East Coast and Europe now require 47 percent and 33 percent more journey time respectively. Shipments from China to Europe take 25 percent longer. The impacts on businesses include increased costs for container hire, up to three-to-four-week delays to deliveries, and stock shortages in stores and production lines.

The US and UK have launched airstrikes against the Al-Houthis, and the EU and US have set up maritime protection forces in and around the Red Sea; neither strategy has prevented Al-Houthi activity. Nevertheless, while airstrikes are unlikely to halt them, they could temporarily diminish the intensity and length of attacks.

KEY JUDGMENTS

- Red Sea diversions will continue to negatively affect shipping times, vessel availability, and port congestion in Asia. The latter two are likely to have their own effects on shipping time and cost and make supply chains more susceptible to failure.
- Renewed conflict between Israel and LH would not have a global impact on maritime supply chains but would put strain on local supply chains with potentially devastating results.
- A prolonged confrontation between Israel and Iran remains a possibility and would be hugely disruptive to energy markets.


However, if strikes against them increase, the Al-Houthis could intensify attacks or become increasingly indiscriminate; more shipping companies would then likely avoid the Red Sea route.

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND IRAN

Renewed and protracted fighting between Israel and Lebanese Hizballah (LH), or one in which the Israeli navy were to become more active, could disrupt maritime services in the Mediterranean. Related disruption, however, is unlikely to be widespread, with the impact likely limited to the two respective countries. Israeli ports, particularly Haifa, would once again be struck by LH. Businesses within Israel may see supply chains impacted should facilities be significantly damaged, or if shipping companies stop calling. Offshore energy infrastructure and vessels believed to be Israel-bound may also be targeted.

Lebanese ports could also be affected, either by closures, airstrikes, or by shipping companies ceasing to call. The extent of such closures would likely depend on the scale of Israeli operations. Extensive disruption could prove devastating to the country's population, with Lebanon heavily reliant on maritime imports for food and other essentials – in 2020, 82 percent of the country's international trade went through the Port of Beirut alone.

Shipping Vessel Attacks in the Red Sea



Further afield, maritime services to and from Syria, Türkiye, and Cyprus could be impacted. However, the effect on the wider Mediterranean, including the Suez Canal, would be mitigated by the proximity of military forces from major powers with interests in the region, including both the US and Russia. Another mitigating factor is the absence of major shipping lanes in the northeastern Mediterranean. However, GPS and other navigational and communication service disruptions, already relatively common between Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Cyprus, could increase in the event of a protracted conflict, negatively impacting safety.

The most significant impact of Israel-LH hostilities would result from greater involvement of Iran and its regional proxies. Iran's control over the Strait of Hormuz, and therefore access to oil and gas hubs in the Gulf, means its participation in any escalation could significantly disrupt energy markets. Approximately a third of gas and a quarter of global oil consumption passes through the Strait annually, and price increases resulting from energy infrastructure being targeted would be felt worldwide. While direct war between Israel, the US, and Iran may be

unlikely, Tehran will almost certainly resort to harassing or seizing vessels or drone attacks, as it has previously done during heightened tensions. Iran could also encourage other groups it supports to strike maritime targets in the region. While isolated incidents are unlikely to cause significant disruption, a miscalculation or deliberate escalation could be consequential.

CONCLUSION

Disruptions in the Red Sea will not ease soon and could deteriorate through 2025. Diversions around the longer African route are now routine, along with the associated extended shipping times. Disruption at major Asian ports, in particular, puts strain on supply chains and increases the likelihood of failure should another crisis emerge. Disruption to port services in Lebanon, Israel, and Syria could result in a humanitarian crisis in Lebanon and exacerbate ongoing crises in Gaza and Syria. Meanwhile, any escalation involving Iran could significantly impact energy markets, which would be felt globally.

AVIATION

Conflict Escalation and Air Travel Impacts Into 2025

Conflict in the Middle East will continue to disrupt the aviation sector as airlines work to safely navigate the area and adapt services during any escalations. Temporary airspace closures, including in Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, have previously caused the short-notice cancellation of flights over the region. A significant regional escalation would likely elevate the immediate threat to, and operational challenges for, the aviation industry and cause permanent changes to global air travel.

CONFLICT ZONES IN AVIATION

While hostilities persist in the Middle East, a significant impact on civil aviation across the globe remains possible, with the most severe threat being the potential misidentification of aircraft, leading to an accidental shutdown by a direct belligerent or one of its backers. Within the last decade, two commercial airliners have been shot down over areas of heightened tensions or ongoing conflict. In 2014, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur was brought down over eastern Ukraine with a surface-to-air missile. In 2020, Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 from Tehran to Kyiv was shot down shortly after takeoff.

KEY JUDGMENTS

- The Middle East conflict will continue to impact the aviation industry into 2025.
- Primary threats as well as security and safety challenges in and around conflict zones could have a far-reaching domino effect within the global aviation industry.
- Continued high-intensity conflict or a major escalation in the Middle East will likely create long-term changes to global aviation and air connectivity.

Flights could also encounter navigational interference and other operational challenges, including route changes, flight cancellations, increased flight time, and fuel burn. The safety of airport infrastructure or the short-notice closure of an airfield, such as Ben Gurion International Airport – Israel’s primary international entry and exit hub – can also create long-term consequences for regional connectivity.


ELECTRONIC INTERFERENCES AND NAVIGATIONAL CHALLENGES

Several airlines have canceled routes to Middle Eastern countries, including Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon, citing operational or security challenges. Tensions around the wider region present significant challenges to flights, including the risk of GPS spoofing and signal jamming or the interference of navigational equipment to impede accurate positioning, timing, or navigation of the aircraft. Spoofing occurs when false signals are sent to the aircraft while jamming blocks its navigational capability. Navigational interferences will typically be the unintentional consequence of military operations in the area, though they can – at best – represent a serious inconvenience to aircraft and passengers.

Spoofing and jamming have become significant daily concerns for the aviation industry, with amplified frequency and emphasis in Eastern Europe and the borders of Russia. European Baltic states, Balkan nations neighboring the Black Sea, as well as Cyprus, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, have all reported instances of interference with systems on civil aircraft. Spoofing and jamming in these areas have increased since 2022, though the last year has seen a substantial upsurge in the severity of the reports in some regions.

Major escalations in the Middle East, particularly between Israel and Iran, will likely further disrupt air travel not only regionally, but also across the global navigation system. A spread of conflict would likely also increase the frequency of electronic interference and spillover risks to operators in neighboring airspaces.

Operational challenges will also occur when circumnavigating a conflict area or maintaining a particular mandated altitude in an emergency. Although rare, an inflight emergency while over a conflict zone may allow only limited options apart from descending into the conflict airspace or landing in the country of conflict.



FLIGHT DISRUPTIONS TO TRAVELERS, CARGO, AND BUSINESSES

As seen with other global shock events, an extreme escalation in the Middle East would significantly – and likely permanently – impact aviation operations.

Navigating around conflicts will increase congestion in surrounding airspace and strain air traffic control systems. Avoiding conflict zones could also increase flight distances and therefore fuel and operating costs. Airport operations will also be impacted due to slot and gate availability during flight cancellations or delays. Changes to operations would also limit the type of aircraft used and the availability of flight crews. Air cargo and business travel will be particularly sensitive to significant alterations to common oceanic routes. An extended suspension or change of these routes could be unsustainable for airlines and create a lasting impact on global trade routes and business operations.

Public perception surrounding flight safety near conflict zones and concerns regarding aircrafts’ ability to depart an area in the event of escalation will also likely remain a

challenge for business operations and air travel demand. Persistent conflict will discourage start-up airlines in the region or bankrupt active airlines, leading to the loss of connectivity, aviation jobs, decreased competition, and the loss of aircraft orders. Lack of competition in the local market will likely increase demand and ticket prices for remaining carriers. The changing operating environment, including related sanctions, will likely lead to supply chain challenges and the availability of aircraft parts for maintenance, which will likely impact overall safety.

CONCLUSION

Protracted conflict will increasingly impact air travel, with significant challenges and long-term consequences to the aviation industry. An intensification and spread of hostilities around the Middle East would lead to an increase in closed or conflict airspace zones and probably lead to permanent changes; the immediate direct threats to aircraft near conflict zones, and the longer-term safety challenges to stakeholders, including airlines and Civil Air Authorities, will have a far-reaching impact on the sector.

CYBERSECURITY

The Power of Geopolitics: Protecting Critical Infrastructure Amid Worsening Geopolitical Landscape

Geopolitical instability, highlighted by devastating and disruptive conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, continues to underline the need for both the public and private sector to enhance cybersecurity for critical infrastructure. The development and evolution of AI and the continuing progress in quantum computing is forecast to bring new benefits and challenges to cybersecurity professionals. Alongside these high-level developments, the world will continue to grapple with more traditional threats such as cloud security and supply chain issues.

KEY JUDGMENTS

- Cyber insecurity is increasing as a result of instability arising from regional conflicts and global great-power competition.
- Beyond AI, quantum computing is emerging as a new threat that could reshape the cybersecurity landscape.
- By 2025, increased regulation and government oversight will push businesses to strengthen their compliance efforts.

NEED FOR ROBUST CYBER PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Prolonged conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East and competition between the West and China for global influence have taken a considerable toll on international stability in recent years. Cybersecurity has undoubtedly been a collateral victim, with signs that technology is increasingly used to undermine adversaries' critical infrastructure. Cyberattacks on vital services are not a new phenomenon, yet there have been signs that such campaigns are becoming more intense, widespread, and directly spearheaded by state-sponsored threat actors and their cybercriminal affiliates. Unsurprisingly, the prime suspects remain China and Russia, with their main goal being to infiltrate and maintain access to Western critical infrastructure.

In 2024, China attempted or succeeded in compromising US targets, including its defense sector, electric and water utilities, internet providers, transportation, and other critical systems. Both US and European utilities were also victims of Russian-sponsored attacks as part of an orchestrated sabotage campaign to influence public opinion and to sow discord among Western allies related to the Ukrainian war, and increasingly linked to long-term preparation for eventual direct conflict.

Along with digital gaps, the physical security of the global internet infrastructure remains widely exposed. Undersea internet cables, which form the backbone of today's global connectivity, are largely unguarded and pose an easy target. Relatively minor damage caused by Yemeni Houthis to undersea cables in the Red Sea in March 2024 was a timely reminder about their inherent vulnerability. More concerningly, in September 2024, the US authorities warned about a possible Russian sabotage of internet cables in the North Sea and the Atlantic.

Despite efforts to make it more resilient, some critical infrastructure is still poorly protected. Undersea internet cables pose the most obvious target, as do operational technology and industrial control systems. With the increased digitalization of critical infrastructure, these traditionally isolated systems have inevitably become more exposed and vulnerable to cyberattacks. In view of the worsening geopolitical context, 2025 will likely witness efforts by both nation states and their cyber-criminal partners to exploit these existing security gaps to steal valuable information and conduct espionage or sabotage.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION OF AI AND THE CONTINUING PROGRESS IN QUANTUM COMPUTING IS FORECAST TO BRING NEW BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES TO CYBERSECURITY PROFESSIONALS.

NEW THREATS ARISE AS AI BECOMES PART OF MAINSTREAM

Over the past two years, artificial intelligence (AI) has become an integral part of the digital economy, raising new questions around cybersecurity. AI has been misused in various ways, including sophisticated social engineering, automation of attack chains, identity theft, and spread of disinformation.

Quantum computing is also likely to transform cybersecurity. Unlike traditional computing, based on bits of data, quantum computing relies on qubits, and promises vast expansion of computing power. While still in its infancy, quantum computing has been on the radar of both the private and the public sectors. Once fully operational, the technology is expected to make the most complex existing encryption standards obsolete. There are already signs that both cyber criminals and nation states are resorting to "harvest now, decrypt later" tactics to accumulate vast quantities of stolen encrypted data in the hope of decrypting it in the future with the help of quantum computing. In response, in August 2024, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) introduced new post-quantum cryptography algorithms, prompting the industry to gradually transition towards post-quantum cybersecurity.

CYBERSECURITY WILL BE DIFFERENTIATOR BETWEEN GOOD AND BAD BUSINESS PRACTICES

The expanding array of cyber threats will compel companies to invest more in cybersecurity, including technology, training, and crisis management through 2025. Cloud security and third-party risks will remain a priority. Therefore, there will likely be a push for more regulation and government oversight to protect data exposure in 2025. This trend will put additional pressure on businesses, both by the regulators and the industry, to invest more in their compliance programs and align their cybersecurity with best practices, standards, and regulations. Proactive cybersecurity will increasingly be viewed as a differentiator between good and bad business practices in all sectors and industries rather than a purely internal consideration.

CONCLUSION

In an era of escalating geopolitical tensions, robust cybersecurity for critical infrastructure is essential. Protecting these systems from increasingly sophisticated threats will differentiate resilient organizations and underpin global stability. Proactive cybersecurity is not just a defense – it is a strategic imperative.

HEALTH


The Impact of Conflict on Public Health

The repercussions of conflict will extend beyond immediate damage, creating long-term public health crises that will affect global health security.

As global conflicts intensify, their impact on public health will become increasingly evident. Conflict will continue to lead to both direct effects, in the form of casualties, and indirect effects, like disease outbreaks, widespread displacement, disruptions in healthcare, and psychological trauma.


KEY JUDGMENTS

- Conflict will increasingly hinder global public health efforts as healthcare infrastructure collapses, vaccination programs halt, and infectious diseases surge in affected regions.
- Health crises in conflict zones will have the potential to have global effects through displaced populations, impacting regional and international public health systems.
- Coordinated responses that focus on immediate relief efforts, emphasize building resilient health systems, and prepare for long-term recovery once hostilities have ended will be necessary to mitigate the adverse effects of war on healthcare systems.



Destroyed Children Hospital in Kyiv, Ukraine

Countries Impacted by Targeted Attacks on Health Facilities (2023-2024)



IMPACT OF CONFLICT ON PUBLIC HEALTH

Wars in regions like Ukraine, Sudan, and Gaza are causing widespread public health crises. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), around 1.8 billion people live in areas affected by war, where health needs escalate while access to care plummets. These crises not only lead to immediate casualties but also have long-term consequences for public health. Conflict-related morbidity and mortality will continue to severely stretch hospital capacities, as combatant and civilian casualties are prioritized over routine patients, straining facilities and disrupting routine healthcare services. The deliberate targeting of healthcare facilities during hostilities will further exacerbate these challenges.

WIDESPREAD POPULATION DISPLACEMENT

As in previous years, war will be a primary driver of population displacement in 2025. By the end of 2023, 117.3 million people – equivalent to the entire population of Egypt – had been forcibly displaced due to conflict-related disruptions. Most refugees (73 percent) come from five countries: Afghanistan, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Venezuela. Neighboring host countries, often low and middle-income nations, will struggle to accommodate

these displaced populations, placing immense strain on their healthcare systems.

As mobility increases, infectious diseases will spread from conflict zones to neighboring countries. Refugees will face higher disease risks due to collapsed healthcare systems in their home countries and poor sanitation during migration. In host countries, overcrowded camps with inadequate shelter, food, sanitation, and water will further heighten disease risks. Additionally, refugees will often struggle to access healthcare in host countries due to legal status, language barriers, and discrimination.

HEALTHCARE SYSTEM DISRUPTION

War will continue to impact healthcare infrastructure severely, limiting medical services and disrupting supply chains. In the more than 500 days since hostilities in Sudan escalated, more than 80 percent of the nation's hospitals in conflict zones have become non-functional, with remaining facilities overwhelmed. Additionally, humanitarian aid efforts are restricted due to ongoing violence and limited access. Active combat, territorial control by belligerents, and violence against health and aid workers will hinder aid delivery.

WAR WILL CONTINUE TO IMPACT HEALTHCARE INFRASTRUCTURE SEVERELY, **LIMITING MEDICAL SERVICES AND DISRUPTING SUPPLY CHAINS.**



Attacks on medical facilities will likely continue to impede healthcare provision. In 2023, there were more than 620 attacks targeting health facilities, especially in Myanmar, the Palestinian Territories, Sudan, and Ukraine. More than 480 healthcare professionals were killed, depriving vulnerable populations of critical care. Post-conflict shortages of healthcare personnel, medications, and supplies are common; damaged facilities will often remain non-operational.

LIMITED ACCESS TO FOOD, CLEAN WATER, AND SANITATION

Access to essential resources like clean water, food, and sanitation facilities will be compromised in conflict zones, leading to rising waterborne and foodborne diseases through the coming year. Malnutrition will be another critical issue, especially among displaced populations. In Sudan's Aboutengue camp, for example, hundreds of children are currently being treated for moderate-to-severe acute malnutrition due to reduced food rations.

In some situations, access to food and water will be deliberately restricted. The destruction of water infrastructure has reportedly become a common tactic to destabilize regions, as has been alleged during hostilities in Gaza, Sudan, and Ukraine. This "weaponization" of water will contribute to outbreaks of diseases like cholera – especially among children under five, who are 20 times more at risk of dying from diarrheal diseases than from conflict-related violence.

WORSENING BURDEN OF DISEASE

Populations in conflict zones will face increased infectious disease risks due to disrupted healthcare, interrupted vaccination programs, poor sanitation, displacement, and overcrowding. Since the renewal of the civil war in Sudan, cholera, malaria, and dengue fever outbreaks have surged due to population displacement and the destruction of healthcare and sanitation infrastructure.

Vaccination programs will also be severely affected. Violence disrupts supply chains, impedes healthcare workers, and limits public access to vaccination sites. As a result, vaccine-preventable diseases (VPDs) such as polio, measles, and diphtheria will continue to reemerge. For example, the war in Gaza has caused a significant drop in vaccination rates, from 99 percent in 2022 to 89 percent in 2023, leading to the reemergence of polio after 25 years. This highlights the urgent need for stable healthcare systems and uninterrupted vaccination efforts in conflict zones to prevent VPDs from reemerging.



Armed conflicts will create new health challenges while existing healthcare needs persist. Chronic and non-communicable diseases (NCDs) require continuous care, and even short lapses will lead to complications, disability, and premature deaths; in emergency settings, heart attacks and strokes typically occur two-to-three times more frequently. Disruptions in healthcare provision will exacerbate the threats from chronic and NCDs, increasing morbidity and mortality rates.

MENTAL HEALTH OUTCOMES

The psychological toll of today's conflicts will be far-reaching through 2025 and beyond, with many affected by trauma, anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) – challenges that will persist long after the fighting ends. The WHO estimates that one in five people exposed to war will develop a mental health disorder at some stage. Healthcare workers will be particularly vulnerable due to stress from their overwhelming work conditions and trauma due to the violence itself. The inaccessibility of mental health services in conflict zones will exacerbate these psychological issues; the effect on the mental health of individuals can therefore be protracted and will, in many cases, also affect those around them.

GLOBAL AND NATIONAL HEALTHCARE STRATEGIES IN CONFLICT ZONES

Addressing the public health crises caused by wars will require coordinated, multi-level responses. Humanitarian efforts will need to focus not only on immediate relief but

also on building resilient healthcare systems that can recover and sustain public health services in the long term. Increased collaboration between international organizations and local governments will be essential to protect healthcare workers and infrastructure, deliver vital services, and rebuild health systems.

Preexisting factors, including population demographics and the baseline quality of healthcare services before the outbreak of hostilities will influence public health outcomes in conflict zones. On occasion, mortality rates will be more closely tied to these factors than to the hostilities themselves. Therefore, response efforts will need to address immediate needs and long-term strategies to strengthen local health systems.

CONCLUSION

The public health consequences of war are complex and long-lasting, and will affect both local and global health in the longer term. From the destruction of healthcare infrastructure and the rise of infectious diseases to mental health challenges and widespread displacement, conflict zones will continue to create immense public health challenges in the coming year. Travelers and organizations working in or near these regions will face increased threats from injury, infectious diseases, mental health challenges, travel restrictions, evacuation requirements, and limited access to essential supplies. They will therefore require extensive additional preparation if planning to operate in such areas.



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In-Depth Q&A with Dr. Ron Braverman, Crisis24 Global Medical Director



On Aug. 14, the WHO declared mpox (formerly known as monkeypox) outbreaks in Africa to be a Public Health Emergency of International Concern.*

In this Q&A, Crisis24's Global Medical Director, Dr. Ron Braverman, sheds light on how misinformation during public health emergencies can compromise employee safety and business continuity. He also discusses how proactive medical assistance solutions not only protect employees, but strengthen an organization's overall resilience.

* Public Health Emergency of International Concern is not synonymous with "Global Outbreak." Visit WHO for more information on the status of mpox.

**"IN PUBLIC HEALTH, NOBODY IS SAFE
UNTIL EVERYBODY IS SAFE. IT ALL STARTS
WITH EMPOWERING THE INDIVIDUAL."**



MEDICAL ASSISTANCE

Q: How has misinformation impacted organizations' ability to keep employees informed and safe during public health emergencies while maintaining business continuity?

A: The WHO's declaration on mpox demonstrates how critical it is for organizations to act on reliable, up-to-date information. Misinformation in the media can spread panic, increasing risks to employees and disrupting operations. Several Crisis24 clients sought immediate guidance on what the WHO's declaration meant for their employees and operations.

Medical assistance providers like Crisis24 help organizations cut through misinformation by delivering clear, evidence-based recommendations. During the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, an employee's risk profile could change drastically within hours as they traveled between countries. By equipping employees with accurate, medically driven advice – such as whether they need vaccinations or how to mitigate risks while traveling – organizations can combat misinformation and keep their people safe. This approach not only protects the individual, but also enhances the organization's overall resilience.

Q: How can organizations fulfill duty of care obligations while empowering employees to manage their own risk?

A: When a public health emergency arises, employees naturally have questions: "Is my work trip risky?", "Is it safe to go into the office?", "What if I get sick mid-travel?"

An organization is only as strong as its people. A proactive focus on each individual employee is crucial. Assumptions shouldn't be made about employees understanding their personal risk levels or how these risks can evolve. Evidence-based guidance, tailored to each employee, is key. Without clear communication, confusion and distrust take root.

Medical assistance providers ensure that employees receive the answers they need, beginning with personalized, pre-travel discussions and confidential risk assessments. This includes evaluating their immunization status, personal health, travel history, and specific behaviors that may affect their risk. By establishing a foundation of trust through ongoing communication, organizations can meet their duty of care obligations while empowering employees to make informed decisions.

Q: What are some operational challenges organizations face during public health emergencies, and how can medical assistance companies help?

A: Public health emergencies like the mpox outbreak present evolving challenges. What's true today may be outdated tomorrow. Organizations with international operations face difficulties – especially if an employee traveling from a high-threat region becomes sick. The question then arises: How do we safely reintegrate them into the workplace?

Medical assistance companies provide confidential medical evaluations, guidance on remote work policies, and protocols for symptom monitoring. They also assist with logistical hurdles like evacuations, especially when geopolitical issues threaten airport or border access. Their expertise in anticipating and managing these challenges ensures that both employees and the larger organization remain resilient in the face of rapidly shifting risks.

Q: What training can medical assistance companies provide to help organizations prepare for public health emergencies?

A: Organizations can implement a range of effective training options, from pandemic preparedness programs to infectious disease prevention workshops. For instance, safe travel training might cover vaccinations, how to mitigate risks while traveling, and the appropriate steps to take if symptoms appear.

The key to minimizing risk is to focus on the individual. Start with high-level training, but also offer personalized recommendations based on each employee's unique risk profile. This should include factors like health status, immunizations, job location, social behaviors, and travel plans. By addressing these details, organizations can better protect their workforce and ensure their people are prepared to act.

Large-Scale Event Risk Management at the 2024 Olympic Games

Just as every Olympic athlete's journey begins long before the torch ignites the cauldron at the opening ceremony, the work to safeguard the 2024 Paris Olympic Games started years before the world's eyes turned to the French capital. From July 26 to Aug. 11, Paris became the stage not only for athletic excellence, but also for the culmination of years of planning by French authorities and security agencies.


For Crisis24, the challenge of protecting its clients during such a high-profile event also began well in advance of the first competition, with the intelligence preparation starting more than 18 months before the Games.

Health Risk Management at the Games

For Crisis24, integrating medical expertise into security planning was vital to ensuring the safety of clients – and began over a year in advance. This included on-site assessments of hospitals to identify suitable medical facilities, establishing access and financial procedures with local network partners, building relationships with local physicians, developing contingency plans, advising clients on preventative health measures, and deploying a raft of medical services during the Games.

“WHAT SETS CRISIS24 APART IS THE SEAMLESS INTEGRATION OF THE MEDICAL AND SECURITY COMPONENTS.”

— **Dr. William Lang, MD**, Chief Medical Director, Private Strategic Group, Crisis24



LESSONS IN RESILIENCE

On-the-Ground Intelligence Delivers a Strategic Advantage in Assessing Threats

Large-scale events like the Olympic Games create heightened threats – including geopolitical tensions, crime, civil unrest, cyberattacks, environmental concerns, and terrorism. A proactive approach is standard operating procedure for Crisis24, and its local intelligence analysts in Paris began preliminary risk assessments over a year before the Games began.

In early 2024, the flow of information to clients intensified. In April, monthly briefings were dedicated to a specific deep-dive security topic, and by July, briefings evolved into weekly updates on potential disruptions. Clients received early threat assessments through a business continuity lens, shifting from monthly to daily and finally to real-time reporting as the Games neared. Embedded analysts also began providing support to their clients many months before the Games began, working as an extension of the clients' internal teams.

Real-time monitoring and reporting continued throughout the Games with dedicated extra resources and analysts coordinated across time zones in Singapore, Europe, and the US to ensure comprehensive coverage. In-country Crisis24 experts also aligned their procedures with the International Olympic Committee and local French security agencies to ensure clients received the most timely and relevant information.

“Long before the first brief was sent to clients, our team in Paris was in preparation mode,” said Chris Clough, Lead Intelligence Analyst, who is based in Crisis24's Paris office. “We leveraged the intelligence and local insights we had to get the boots-on-the-ground perspective. It's a real strategic advantage for our clients.”

From July 15 through Sept. 15, Crisis24 issued nearly 1,000 alerts and incident reports. Implementing a lower threshold for incident reporting enabled Crisis24 to capture and share more granular details. This level of precision is a testament to the skill of Crisis24 analysts – and provided clients with the best possible insights for making informed decisions on mitigating risk and forging resilience.

Integrated Technology and Client-First Approach Drive More Informed Decisions

The Games illustrated how human expertise and critical event management technology can converge to deliver the intelligence, insights, and superior user experience that clients expect.

“We considered our clients' perspective right from the beginning,” said Cathy Gill, Vice President, Product Management, Crisis24. “What needs are they telling us they have? What needs do we anticipate they will have? And how can we fulfill those needs as comprehensively and seamlessly as possible? Our technology platforms must address those questions.”

Informed is empowered, and integrating Crisis24 Horizon with TopoONE platforms provided clients with a “single pane of glass” to guide decision-making. From a live, tactical display, clients could plot their assets on the dashboard map and monitor events. For a more in-depth perspective, clients could view traffic camera data in relation to their assets in or around other Olympic sites. Finally, through the native mobile app, travelers at the Games remained connected and informed no matter their location, and could opt in to real-time alerts on-the-go.

The 2024 Olympic Games provided a unique opportunity for Crisis24 to demonstrate on the world stage what's possible when integrated technology and a client-first focus come together. Every client presents with a unique need, risk profile, and business goal. Crisis24 conducts every assessment through this lens, ensuring every client is empowered to make the best possible security decisions.

To learn more, download the case study.



How Crisis24 Saved Lives during the Oct. 7 Hamas Attack on Israel and Its Aftermath

The impacts of the Hamas attack on Israel continue to reverberate, as the region grapples with the new reality for risk and resilience. This timeline provides an overview of the attack and the aftermath through the lens of Crisis24 teams, as they came together to keep clients informed and safe.

LESSONS LEARNED

Every high-profile, critical event can offer after-action insights to help inform Crisis24's risk management and response in the future.

- **Take a Holistic View of Risk** – Considering both immediate threats and the longer-term impacts to business continuity is key to clients' resilience.
- **Coordinate Across Internal Teams to Share Resources** – Sharing information internally avoids duplication of efforts and overburdening local resources.
- **Maintain a Footprint in the Region** – Having personnel available beyond ground zero and into neighboring countries helps speed assessment and next steps.
- **Make Adaptability a Philosophy** – Evolving with changing threats and conditions enables a stronger, more proactive response and better outcomes.



First case opened
10/7/23

Last case closed
10/26/23

REAL-TIME THREAT INTELLIGENCE AMID A CRISIS

Incident Monitoring and Reporting

The Incident: Oct. 7, 2023

At 06:30 local time, the Palestinian militant group Hamas crossed Israel's southern border with Gaza, launching an unprecedented attack.

ALERT 1 4:44 AM (UTC) Israel/PT SEVERITY: WARNING

Rocket attacks across central, southern districts; retaliatory strikes likely. Several were wounded.

→ Fast, topline notification not particularly unusual in this region.

ALERT 2 6:12 AM (UTC) Israel/PT SEVERITY: CRITICAL

Gaza militants launch armed assault in southern Israel; casualties reported. Israeli forces announce mobilization, airstrikes.

→ Alerts frequency, scope, and depth increased.

ALERT 3 8:37 AM (UTC) Israel/PT SEVERITY: CRITICAL

Officials confirm hundreds of injuries following rocket barrages in southern and central Israel. Ground clashes ongoing.

ALERT 4 2:17 PM (UTC) Israel/PT SEVERITY: CRITICAL

Ground clashes near Gaza border and rocket attacks into southern and central Israel continue. Violence likely to persist.

Several airlines canceled flights to and from Israel. IDF reportedly closed roads near Gaza Strip border.

ALERT 5 11:57 PM (UTC) Israel/PT SEVERITY: CRITICAL

Cross-border violence likely to continue.

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu declared Israel to be "at war," called for large mobilization of military reservists.

Heightened security measures and disruptions to transport and business will almost certainly continue in central and southern areas of Israel over at least the short term.

A GLOBALLY ORCHESTRATED TEAM OF EXPERTS

Activating our Critical Event Management Response

Crisis24's Global Operations Center (GOC) alerted the relevant teams, initiated strategic protocols to support clients and mobilized specialist divisions, including Global Intelligence, Embedded Intelligence, Medical Teams, Response Operations, and other Crisis Management experts.

A SWIFT, COORDINATED RESPONSE

Crisis Response Operations

Crisis24 met each client's need – from relocations within Israel to evacuations across borders. On-the-ground intelligence was gathered from trusted sources and fed back to the Crisis24 analyst team.

Over three weeks of continuous round-the-clock operations, Crisis24 GOCs managed:

- 111 calls for advice or assistance
- 41 active crisis response cases
- 139 personnel evacuated by coordinating:
 - 34 secure ground transportation moves
 - 3 cross-border moves into Jordan
 - 2 air charter flights
 - 28 commercial flights
 - 4 accommodation bookings

DYNAMIC COMMUNICATIONS

Immediate Outreach and Strategic Client Support

Clients received tailored security briefs on employees' locations and security situations – such as the status of Ben Gurion International Airport, transportation options, and shelter-in-place considerations.

Crisis24 handled 7,730 communications to advise, inform, and coordinate with its clients, including:

- 3,800 emails and 3,629 secure direct messages (e.g. WhatsApp)

LEADING THE DIALOGUE AS A TRUSTED ADVISOR

Thought Leadership Expertise

An intelligence-led blog and webinar were available within 48 hours of the incident to help address some of the most frequent questions and concerns from clients.

Ongoing evidence-based analysis strengthened confidence that emerging risks are on Crisis24's radar.

To learn more, download the case study.



Risk Assessment Ratings Maps

Crisis24's country-specific security and risk rating maps provide informed indicators of security conditions for a high-level understanding of a country's threat profile. With the assurance of extensive analytical coverage and pressure-tested methodologies, Crisis24 continuously monitors the operating environment and updates threat ratings as conditions change. Each country is rated on a scale from 1-5 (minimal, low, moderate, high, or extreme) to indicate the threat level. The country security and risk ratings provide a clear picture of potential concerns and can help inform risk mitigation strategies.



Included in the 2025 Global Risk Forecast are eight risk assessment maps, consisting of an overall security and risk rating map, specialized category maps, and a master map that reflects the overall country rating with high and/or severe specialized threats specific to each country.



DOWNLOAD MAPS
<https://bit.ly/C24GRF25RiskMaps>

To access these maps, please visit our digital version by scanning the QR code or typing the address into the browser.

About Crisis24

A global, AI-enhanced platform for travel risk management, mass notifications, critical event management, crisis-security consulting and personal protection solutions, including a leading global medical concierge practice, Crisis24 allows prominent organizations, disruptive brands and influential people to operate with confidence in an uncertain world. With a uniquely integrated and scalable platform, Crisis24 has an unrivaled financial profile that allows for strong investment in R&D, technology and innovation.

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EMAIL OR VISIT US AT:
INFO@CRISIS24.COM
CRISIS24.COM

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Contributors

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Steven Adam
Intelligence Analyst, Americas

Sharanya Anguraj
Regional Manager, Asia-Pacific

Michael Baney
Regional Manager, Americas

Jose de Bastos
Intelligence Analyst, Americas

Ante Batovic
Senior Consultant, Information Security

Jacopo Di Bella
Intelligence Analyst, Asia-Pacific

Terry Berna
Intelligence Analyst, Africa

Terence Chaplet
Intelligence Analyst, Africa

Chris Clough
Intelligence Analyst, Europe & Central Asia

Christian Contro
Intelligence Analyst, Europe & Central Asia

Jim Duck
Watch Operations Manager

Joe Dvorak
Regional Manager, Europe & Central Asia

Mawande Gidimisana
Intelligence Analyst, GIS

Charles Hogger
Intelligence Analyst, Environment

Janna Hyland
Intelligence Analyst, Aviation

Jonathon Keymer
Director of Intelligence

Genevieve Labuschagne
Intelligence Analyst, Asia-Pacific

Maria Leasure
Category Intelligence Manager

Grace Lim
Intelligence Analyst, Asia-Pacific

Danielle Marais
Intelligence Analyst, Transportation

Robyn Mazriel
Health Intelligence Analyst

Sara Melchiades
Intelligence Analyst, Americas

Matthieu Metivier
Intelligence Analyst, Africa

Brian Moser
Intelligence Analyst, Europe & Central Asia

Daniel Saenz
Intelligence Analyst, Americas

Sumedha Senanayake
Director of Intelligence

Mick Sharp
Senior Vice President Operations & Intelligence

Jonathan Vincent
Cyber Intelligence Lead

Tumi Wallace
Regional Manager, Europe & Central Asia


Alex Watt
Intelligence Analyst, Maritime

Tim Williams
Intelligence Analyst, GIS

Pedro-Ann Windvogel
Health Intelligence Analyst

Elizabeth Yin
Intelligence Analyst, Environment

Middle East and North Africa
Intelligence Team, Crisis24





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**GLOBAL RISK
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2025**